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Abstract 
 
This study examines the convergence of events, internationally and domestically, in the 
last decade that led to Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali challenging U.S. cotton subsidies. It 
outlines the political and economic context in which West African and American cotton 
farmers compete. It explores how the West Africans have confronted U.S. policy, why 
their cause has generated sympathy and interest, whether they are likely to be successful, 
and the implications of their campaign. The paper draws from analyses of the financial 
impact of U.S. cotton subsidies, documents filed with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), public statements, media coverage, materials from nongovernmental 
organizations, and interviews with involved parties. It identifies four actors driving this 
initiative: the cotton farmers, the producers’ unions, the states and the international 
financial institutions, and their tactics: using the WTO, having many spokespeople with 
common messages, having powerful allies and using the media. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
West African cotton farmers are at the centre of a highly-politicised global trade 
debate in which billions of dollars and the wellbeing of millions of people are at stake. In 
the past two decades, the cotton industries of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have become 
increasingly competitive and have gained a growing share of the world market. Only the 
United States exports more cotton than West and Central Africa. Producer profits in the 
three countries have long been determined by their governments, which have controlled 
the cotton sector and set prices. Under pressure domestically and from international 
institutions, governments have gradually withdrawn state support, putting the fate of the 
cotton producers into the hands of the free market. At the same time, despite international 
trade agreements, the U.S. government increased payments to its cotton producers. These 
subsidies are blamed for driving down the world cotton price by increasing supply, 
reducing the money earned by West African farmers and governments. In response, they 
have joined forces and solicited help to influence U.S. policy. 
The plight of the West Africans has been highly publicised and broadly 
supported, although cotton is just one of many crops whose profits are skewed by 
imbalanced subsidy programs. Perhaps surprisingly, their efforts seem to be having an 
effect. Which factors contributed to this confrontation, and why has it gained 
momentum? This paper examines the convergence of events, internationally and within 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and the United States, that led to this showdown. It outlines 
the political and economic context in which West African and American cotton farmers 
are competing. It explores how the West African cotton farmers and governments have 
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confronted the challenge of U.S. subsidies, why their cause has generated sympathy and 
interest, whether they are likely to be successful, and the implications of their efforts. If 
the West Africans succeed in influencing U.S. policy, this paper could serve as a case 
study in how and why. 
This subject is significant and timely, as African countries try to increase 
prosperity and lift themselves out of poverty. Economic growth in most African countries 
has stagnated or declined in the last 40 years. If they are to reverse this trend, it is 
important to consider the macroeconomic environment, and what needs to be done to 
support economic growth in Africa. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently 
negotiating international agricultural policy. The “Doha development round,” scheduled 
for completion in 2005, seeks to give priority to the concerns of developing countries and 
their participation in the multilateral trading system, with a core objective of alleviating 
poverty. 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali are three of the poorest countries in the world and 
those whose economies are most reliant on cotton exports. The West African farmers are 
extremely low-cost producers of cotton and the only ones consistently to increase export 
volume over the last 20 years. The region is poised to double its world market share by 
2010 (World Bank, 2000, p.5). Viewed in strictly economic terms – laws of supply and 
demand, with comparative advantages rewarding the most efficient producers – the West 
Africans should benefit from low labour costs, a large workforce, a high-quality product, 
increasing demand, investment and liberalizing their cotton sectors. Instead, farmers eke 
out a living while their governments try to appease international lenders and battle with 
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an American Administration and Congress bound to a powerful farm lobby driving the 
world’s most expensive cotton subsidies. 
Subsidies are government payments to farmers, which offset the cost of 
production and enable farmers to produce more. The artificially-induced increase in 
supply drives down the world market price. Producers who are not subsidised lose profits 
or must sell at a loss. Free trade advocates criticise subsidies for undermining competition 
and distorting the “playing field.” Yet, despite calls for reform, rich countries subsidise 
their farmers by about $1 billion per day. In 2002, the United States Congress passed a 
$180 billion Farm Bill -- the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act – that increased 
subsidies for farmers, up to 80 percent for commodities such as cotton.  
Developing countries cannot afford to subsidise their farmers anywhere close to 
those levels. Furthermore, international financial institutions and donor countries, such as 
the United States, press developing countries to reduce government intervention. To 
qualify for aid from international monetary institutions (World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund) and donors (U.S. and European Union), governments of developing 
countries often must commit to liberalised economies. They are forced to implement 
economic principles consistent with a free market economy, while the developed 
countries, not beholden to foreign assistance, do not have to adopt the same policies.  
This paper defines liberalisation as a move to market-determined prices from 
what was previously a regulated regime. “For commodity markets, liberalization has 
meant reducing government involvement in marketing and in production, increasing 
participation of the private sector in these activities and reducing distortions in 
commodity prices, especially producer prices” (Gilbert and Varangis, 2003, p. 1-2). To 
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varying degrees and with mixed success, Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have followed 
the guidelines prescribed by the international financial institutions.  
American subsidies are just one of many factors affecting the health of the cotton 
sectors in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. The U.S. is not the only industrialised country 
whose subsidies influence world cotton prices. Other international policies also affect 
textile trade, such as the Multifibre Arrangement, which set quotas restricting imports of 
textiles and apparel until January 2005. This paper focuses specifically on the 
implications of U.S. policy for the following reasons: 1) the U.S. is by far the world’s 
largest exporter of cotton (40 percent) and therefore, has the greatest influence on world 
prices; 2) with the 2002 Farm Bill, the U.S. bucked a trend toward reduction of subsidies; 
3) the primary factor affecting cotton exports from Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali is not 
quotas on imports (i.e. the Multifibre Arrangement) but the reduced world price of the 
commodity -- in other words, their challenge is not being unable to sell more cotton to the 
U.S., but being unable to get a fair price for their cotton on the world market. 
The reason for focusing on Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali is because they are 
three of the countries most affected by U.S. cotton subsidies, they have invested great 
efforts in developing their cotton industries, and they are part of the region that has most 
significantly increased cotton production. They have the potential to benefit from 
increasing demand for cotton. These countries are similar in terms of development 
indicators, geography, history as former French colonies and evolution of their cotton 
industries, so they provide a good basis for comparison. They share a history of state-
controlled cotton industries and have been implementing domestic policy reforms for 
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long enough (one decade) to compare where their approaches diverge and where they 
converge. 
Agriculture is one of the few sectors where developing and developed countries 
compete. It has added significance because agricultural commodities tend to comprise a 
disproportionate share of the resources of developing countries. Many developing 
countries are negatively affected by the subsidies of developed countries. Therefore, it is 
timely and useful to consider what the West Africans are doing about U.S. legislation. 
One could apply a similar approach to analyze the impact of U.S. subsidies on Brazilian 
cotton farmers or Mexican corn growers, or European Union subsidies on sugar farmers 
in Mozambique, and the responses of those countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a framework for analysis, 
including a literature review, theoretical framework and research methods. Chapter 3 
looks at the political origins of the economic patterns in the U.S. and West Africa, and 
provides the context in which liberalisation is touted, but not always followed. Chapter 4 
provides a brief history of cotton production in West Africa, with detailed chapters on 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, and the prognosis for the region’s cotton sector. Chapter 5 
explores the strategy and tactics by which the West Africans are attempting to influence 
U.S. policy, and considers their motivation. It also discusses why U.S. cotton subsidies 
have drawn worldwide attention.  Chapter 6 considers whether the West Africans are 
likely to be successful and what the implications may be, and presents areas for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2. Framework for analysis 
 
Figure 1 is a causal diagram to guide the analysis. Reading from left to right, it 
shows the cause-and-effect relationships influencing the policies that impact the well-
being of the West African cotton producers. This paper looks at both domestic and 
international influences. 
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           Reduced world cotton price 
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Figure 1: Causal diagram 
 
The boxes in the top and bottom left represent domestic politics in the U.S. and 
the West African countries, respectively.  Though economists have demonstrated that 
trade liberalisation generates net social benefits, politicians face temptation toward 
protectionism, reflecting pressure from domestic groups. These pressures are stronger if 
producers are well-organised and politically well-placed. Though the structure of their 
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cotton industries and their political systems differ, the U.S. and West African 
governments have each faced domestic political pressure to protect their cotton farmers.  
The box in the top left represents U.S. domestic politics, which led to cotton 
subsidies, represented by the box to the immediate right. This paper will discuss the 
historical and political factors underlying U.S. cotton subsides, which have increased 
supply and reduced the world cotton price, negatively impacting the West African cotton 
producers, who are represented by the box on the far right.   
 The box in the bottom left represents the West African domestic politics affecting 
cotton policies, which are represented by the box to its immediate right. This paper will 
explore the conditions and factors in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali that determined the 
policies, which affect the wellbeing of the West African cotton producers, represented by 
the box to the far right. All three countries have liberalised their cotton sectors in the last 
decade, with their domestic political situations influencing the degree to which they did 
so. Benin moved the farthest toward liberalisation, while Mali made the least progress. 
The reduction of state intervention typically means prices farmers receive will be higher, 
but they are more exposed to risk, since they are directly linked to the world cotton price 
and not “cushioned” by state control. 
 The other influence to consider is that of international institutions, such as the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO. These institutions are 
represented by the middle box on the far left. All of these institutions were established to 
support a liberal international economic order. They have an impact on the well-being of 
the West African cotton producers by influencing the domestic policies of Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Mali. The World Bank and IMF influence West African policies because the 
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countries are beholden to those institutions for financial aid. The West African countries 
agreed to liberalise in return for financial assistance. WTO reviews affect whether the 
countries are considered desirable trading partners and the extent to which they 
participate in global trade. 
 The impact of the international financial institutions upon the U.S. is different. 
The power and resources of the U.S. free the country from needing to appease the World 
Bank and the IMF. Unlike the West African states, the U.S. is not dependent upon these 
institutions. The World Bank and the IMF oppose U.S. subsidies, but lack influence to 
alter U.S. policies. However, the WTO may be able to do so, as the U.S. wants support 
for its trade agenda and, therefore, cannot disregard the WTO. In the diagram, the line 
showing the effect of international institutions upon U.S. subsidies contains a question 
mark because it is too early to tell if the WTO will be able to facilitate removal of the 
U.S. subsidies. The WTO is reviewing a challenge of the U.S. cotton subsidies and an 
initiative submitted by the West African countries that calls for their removal. This paper 
will review the unprecedented way in which the West African governments and 
producers have attempted to use the WTO to alter an international trading system that is 
not working to their benefit. 
 
2.1 Literature Review  
 
It is important to view the confrontation between the West Africans and the U.S. 
over cotton in the context of the international political economy. The choices of both the 
American and African political leaders support those who argue that politicians will 
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sacrifice long-term economic gain for short-term political needs (Balaam and Veseth, 
1996; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001; Callaghy, 1990; Van den Broek, 2003).  Despite 
having signed international agreements favouring free trade, the U.S. adopted a Farm Bill 
that costs taxpayers $180 billion and subsidises producers of a product who are not 
internationally competitive. While not in the economic interests of the country, the bill 
ensures political support from the influential cotton lobby and other farming interests 
(Delcros, 2002; Coughlin, Chrystal and Wood, 1991; Ray, 1991). Government support 
for agriculture is embedded in the history of the U.S. (Effland, 2000; Orden, 2003; 
Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture, 2001).  
For their part, the West African governments benefited from a state-run cotton 
system, in which the state set the price and taxed its farmers (Bassett, 2001). Bates argued 
that the basic problem of farming in developing countries is improper incentives for 
farmers, due to government actions that distort the operations of the market. Specifically, 
he said, governments of countries in which agriculture is the greatest source of income 
and principal source of exports (as cotton is for the West Africans) will seek to levy 
revenues from the rural sector in order to build up industry (Bates, 1981, p. 4).  That they 
are being forced, largely through external pressure, to change the system reinforces 
Lake’s position that developing countries are constrained in their choices because they 
are weak (Lake, 1987). 
Many studies describe how subsidies present an unfair trade advantage for 
recipient farmers (Hallett, 1968; Ghatak and Ingersent, 1984; Anderson et al, 2002; 
Supper, 2001). Others quantify the effects of agricultural protection by developed 
countries (Badiane, Dhaneshwar, Goreux and Masson, 2002; Diaz-Bonilla, 2003; IMF, 
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2002c) and criticise them for their impact on poor countries (Goldin, Rogers and Stern, 
2002). An International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) study, for example, found 
that the current level of world prices for agriculture is about 8 to 10 percent below that if 
all agricultural tariffs, export subsidies and domestic supports were removed in the North 
(Diao, Roe and Somwaru, 2002, p. 12).  
Analyses have attempted to quantify the impact of U.S. subsidies on world cotton 
prices, with most arguing that the U.S. is driving down prices substantially (Gillson, 
Poulton, Balcombe and Page, 2004; Watkins, 2002; Badiane, et al, 2002).  Gillson, for 
example, said “under all simulations the U.S. is responsible for the greatest loss in cotton 
earnings from West and Central Africa” (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 34). Others refute that 
U.S. subsidies are the most important factor affecting world cotton prices (Shepherd, 
2004) and argue that the subsidies are a reaction to, not a cause of, low world prices (Ray, 
2002; IATP, 2004). Shepherd stated, “Given the political importance that cotton subsidies 
have acquired … the somewhat limited attention they have received to date from 
empirical economists is surprising” (Shepherd, 2004, p. 1).  A Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) policy brief said estimates of the impact of subsidies on world cotton 
prices vary due to the range of assumptions used by different studies. Analysts have to 
make assumptions as to the degree to which production levels and demand change in 
response to a price change (FAO, 2004). Yet, the FAO brief stated “all of the recent 
studies unambiguously demonstrate that the removal of domestic subsidies in 
industrialized countries reduces cotton production in and exports from these countries” 
and that “the increased excess supply induced by domestic subsidies has a depressing 
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effect on the world market price” (FAO, 2004, p. 1). The West Africans have bolstered 
their lobbying efforts with studies showing that U.S. subsidies depress cotton prices. 
When considering why and how the West Africans have challenged the U.S. 
subsidies, it is important to consider the influence of domestic factors. The history and 
evolution of West African cotton production has been well-researched (Levin, 1999; 
Badiane, et al, 2002; Goreux and Macrae, 2003; World Bank, 2002a; Baffes, 2004a). 
Generally, the vertically-integrated marketing structure established by the French is 
credited for the success and growth of the industry. Bassett, however, said this 
interpretation fails to recognize the contributions of the farmers themselves. Bassett 
highlighted the efforts of farmers, who “have not simply reacted to external 
interventions,” but played important roles in creating the conditions by which the West 
African cotton sector has succeeded (Bassett, 2001, p. xiv). He focused on cotton 
producers in Côte d’Ivoire as representative of West African farmers and demonstrated 
that cotton growing, spinning and weaving were important elements of African rural 
economies long before European explorers and colonists arrived (Bassett, 2001, p. 34). 
Bassett argued that Bates underestimated the capacity of small farmers to organize 
collectively to claim what they perceive as their rightful share of resources, and cited 
their successful strikes, such as those in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali (Bassett, 2001, p. 15). It 
is their efforts, he argued, that make the cotton boom an “exceptional outcome to Robert 
Bates’ assessment of the generally negative effects of public policies on agricultural 
production in Africa” (Bassett, 2001, p. 184). 
Scholars have focused on efforts to liberalise the West African cotton sectors 
(Goreux and Macrae, 2003; Badiane et al, 2002; Zoundi, 2004), the impact of 
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privatisation (Levin, 1999; Harsch, 2000) and future growth potential (World Bank, 
2000). WTO trade policy reviews and reports by the World Bank, the IMF and United 
Nations agencies give additional details on steps taken by the three countries to align 
their cotton sectors with the requirements of international financial institutions. These 
documents offer insight into the motivation of both the West African countries and the 
international institutions to see the pay-off of those efforts. 
However, there has been limited analysis of exactly how the West Africans are 
confronting the challenge of U.S. subsidies. An Oxfam document discussed the role of 
the cotton producers (Baden, 2004) and Goreux gave background on what led to the 
initiative and possible outcomes (Goreux, 2004). This paper attempts to contribute to the 
literature by exploring this question further, using materials from the network of West 
African cotton producers, the Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA, 2004), and documents filed with the WTO, as well as 
public testimony, media reports and interviews. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The cause-and-effect relationships outlined in the causal diagram (p. 6) provide a 
framework for analysing the events that led to the confrontation between the U.S. and the 
West African governments and cotton producers. This research draws from the theories 
of dependency and liberalism, but focuses on nationalism to analyze the issue.  
The dependency theory builds on the idea that international relationships of 
dependency have continued long after formal colonization. It argues that the primary 
obstacles to development are external rather than internal, as developing countries face a 
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global economy dominated by rich industrial countries (www.irtheory.com). This theory 
holds that the continuing poverty of low-income countries is not primarily due to 
deficiencies in the countries themselves, but to their position in an unsympathetic world 
economy (Nicholson, 1998).  American subsidies depress the world cotton price, harming 
both the West African farmers (and those whose well-being depends on them) and their 
governments, who lose export earnings. This imbalance of power, and the benefits it 
affords U.S. cotton producers, ensures the continued poverty of the West Africans and 
blocks their development. Regardless of their domestic policies, their position in the 
world economy guarantees the continued dependence of the West Africans on richer 
countries for aid, and hinders their ability to negotiate more preferential trading terms. 
A liberal framework provides a different perspective. This theory is based on the 
advantages of free markets. Maximizing production and producing more wealth will 
boost economic development. One large global economy will produce the best 
consequences for all (Nicholson, 1998). From this perspective, free trade – unrestricted 
by government intervention -- ultimately benefits everyone involved. According to 
liberalism, abolishing subsidies would produce the best possible outcome. These 
proponents argue that weaker players (developing countries) will benefit the most when 
dominant trading countries (such as the U.S.) play by a common and more liberal set of 
rules (Ingco, 2003, p. x).  
However, this is not what we see. Americans are not practicing free trade. The 
question then becomes, “Why don’t international trading partners implement policies and 
practices known to achieve optimal results?”  It has been argued that the liberal theory 
neglects the political framework within which economic development takes place 
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(Gilpin, 1987, p. 269). Gilpin and others have noted that domestic and international 
configurations of power and the interests of powerful groups and states are important 
determinants of economic development. 
The nationalist theory, which Nicholson calls the “economic corollary” to realism, 
provides an answer to the question posed above. Nationalism says a state’s economic 
policy should be to maximize the benefit to the citizens of the state. States should try and 
protect industries in the hope of protecting employment (Nicholson, 1998). Realists allow 
for circumstances in which states sacrifice economic gain to weaken their opponents or to 
strengthen themselves -- such as with trade protection, which might reduce overall 
income while ensuring national political power (Frieden and Lake, 1991, p. 10).  “In the 
pursuit of power, nation-states shape the international economy to best serve their desired 
ends” (Frieden and Lake, 1991, p. 11). Therefore, one could argue that every country – 
whether developing or developed - will try to “work the system” in its favour. From this 
vantage point, it is to be expected that countries will implement trade practices that 
benefit themselves, even if these are at odds with agreed-upon world trade policies and 
procedures.  
The nationalist theory explains the actions of the U.S. and West African 
governments. The Americans have a vested interest in keeping their farmers – an 
important political lobby – happy, and the subsidies do that. Though the U.S. faces 
criticism for its subsidies, the domestic pressure to keep them has been more important 
for U.S. policy makers. Likewise, the governments of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have 
an interest in maximizing profits from their cotton industry and supporting their cotton 
producers, who provide the largest source of revenue. Because they are dependent on aid 
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and assistance from the developed world, they have followed the rules prescribed to 
them, namely to liberalise their cotton sectors. At the same time, their cotton producers 
have taken an increasingly active role, which has had political implications. The 
producers have been instrumental in pushing their governments to challenge U.S. cotton 
subsidies.  
The strategy used by the West Africans underscores the position put forth in the 
early '80s by Krasner, who argued that international regime change is attractive to weak 
states because they can rarely hope to influence international behaviour solely through 
using their national power capabilities (Krasner, 1981, p. 120). He discussed successful 
efforts to “turn institutions against their creators” (Krasner, 1981, p. 120), which is 
exactly what is happening now. The West Africans are using the WTO and the backing of 
World Bank representatives, and others who advocate liberalism, to take on the U.S. 
subsidies. 
 
2.3 Research methods 
 
To explore the factors underlying the confrontation between the West Africans 
and the U.S., this research is both quantitative and qualitative. It uses existing analyses of 
the financial impact of U.S. cotton subsidies, as well as economic indicators for Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Mali. This information is drawn from, among other sources, the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC), the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO. The paper’s analysis of efforts to influence U.S. policy is qualitative, drawing 
from documents filed with the WTO, public statements of government and industry 
representatives, media coverage and materials produced by nongovernmental 
 16
organizations, such as Oxfam International, as well as interviews with the IDEAS Centre, 
the Malian parastatal cotton company (CMDT) and a consultant to the Malian cotton 
farmers. 
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Chapter 3. North-South relations and the international economic order 
 
The U.S. cotton subsidies are blamed for undermining the lives of millions of 
people and the economies of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. Given the stakes involved 
for the West Africans, a confrontation might have been inevitable. But there is a 
tremendous imbalance in power, which could have prevented the “underdogs” from 
taking action. This section of the paper considers the international political and economic 
context that led to the West African states formally challenging the U.S.   
The field of International Political Economy (IPE) studies the conflicting 
objectives and demands of the market and the state, and the inherent tension between the 
international economy and national concerns. IPE scholars analyse the ways that politics 
affects decision-making in international trade and economic relations. Under “pure” 
economic theory, states improve their standing by specializing in the production of goods 
in which they possess a comparative advantage (Lake, 1987, p. 229). This would explain 
the West Africans’ investment in cotton, for which they are among the world’s lowest 
cost producers. At the same time, the U.S., which has one of the highest costs of cotton 
production, would not invest heavily in the sector.  
However, protectionism can manufacture benefits. Under such conditions, free 
trade policies are viewed as naïve (Balaam and Veseth, 1996, p. 114). In order for 
politicians to get elected and stay in office, they cater to influential domestic interests. 
For this reason, politicians make decisions that serve short-term political interests at the 
expense of long-term international economic benefits (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 
474; Balaam and Veseth, 1996, p. 86; Bates, 1981). “How does one convince 
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governments to change policies that are economically damaging or irrational but 
politically rational?” (Callaghy, 1990, p. 318). 
While removing subsidies makes sense from an economic perspective, legislators 
may have difficulty selling the idea to their constituents. Domestic political concerns and 
pressures apply in all countries. The difference is that developed countries can cater to 
those domestic concerns. Developing countries, however, beholden to international 
financial institutions and wealthier countries for favourable aid and trade terms, are 
forced to implement economic principles consistent with a free-market economy – even if 
they do not wish to do so.  
Marxist economist Joan Robinson wrote that the biggest drawback of a country 
depending upon primary commodities for export earnings (such as the West Africans’ 
reliance on cotton) is the unpredictability of the market. The agricultural sector within an 
industrial economy usually has enough political leverage to see that it is sheltered. 
However, the products from developing countries are “left to the mercy of the laws of 
supply and demand” (Robinson, 1991, p. 381). They are also left to external and internal 
political influences.  
Krasner assumes that Third World countries, like all states, are concerned with 
political vulnerability and, therefore, desire power, control and wealth. Yet, because they 
are weak, they are constrained and unable to alter their environments (Lake, 1987, p. 
224). “One of the great mysteries of modern economic diplomacy is why the high levels 
of export dumping of basic agricultural commodities by corporations based in the United 
States and Europe has gone so long unchallenged” (Ritchie, et al, 2000, p. 5). 
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With globalisation, national economies are becoming increasingly interlinked. This 
integration has political and social implications. As the institution charged with 
establishing protocol for trade between nations, the WTO finds itself at the centre of 
these issues, trying to reconcile conflicting domestic and international priorities. The 
WTO provides a mechanism by which members may challenge one another’s trade-
distorting policies. It is the vehicle for an international regulatory regime to help states 
follow the economically most rational approach by using international rules and litigation 
to influence the political decision-making process (van den Broek, 2003, p. 134).  
However, given the real world power asymmetries that exist, there is a paradox in 
trying to overcome power-based international relations and implement an economically 
rational level-playing field system of international law (van den Broek, 2003, p. 134). 
This was the challenge faced by the individual West African states, and explains why 
they banded together and joined with powerful allies to confront the U.S.  
 
3.1 The importance of cotton  
 
Given the difficulty and risks for the West Africans to confront the U.S., why do 
they bother? Cotton is the world’s most important fibre, making up 40 percent of textile 
trade (Badiane et al, 2002). The economies of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali depend on 
it. Cotton accounts for 77 percent of Benin’s exports (WTO, 2004a) and 18 percent of 
Mali’s (WTO, 2004c), while Burkina Faso earns 57 percent of its export revenue from 
cotton (African Development Bank and OECD, 2004, p. 4).  “While cotton is a minor 
part in the economic activity of industrialized countries, it is of critical importance to a 
number of African countries” (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 1).  
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Photo 1: Cotton farmer near Bla, Mali, November 2004   Photo by E. Lynn Heinisch    
 
Described as one of the pillars of rural development in francophone Africa, the 
cotton sector serves as a principal motor of economic development, generating benefits to 
farmers, rural communities, private traders, cotton companies, and national governments 
(Tefft, 2004).  More than 10 million people in Central and West Africa depend directly 
on cotton production. These farmers are among the world’s lowest-cost producers. They 
typically work small plots of land (2-3 acres), which they plant, weed and harvest by 
hand. Their crop is rain-fed, not irrigated by mechanical systems (Watkins, 2002; Levin, 
1999).  
The region of West and Central Africa is the world’s second-largest cotton 
exporter (after the United States, responsible for 40 percent of world exports) and the 
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only region to consistently increase export volume over the last 20 years. Accounting for 
roughly 15 percent of world cotton exports, West and Central Africa is the world’s 
fastest-growing region of cotton production, poised to double its world market share by 
2010 (World Bank, 2000, p. 5). 
World cotton prices have been falling and were recently at their lowest levels 
since the Great Depression. Prices in the 2001-2002 season were around 42 cents per 
pound. The average price over the 25 preceding years was 72 cents a pound. Figure 2 
shows the world cotton price from 1983 to 2002. 
 
Figure 2: World cotton price, 1983-2002 
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*Chart information from Goreux and Macrae, 2003, pp. 56-61.  
 
A number of factors caused the fall, including competition from synthetics, slow-
down in world economic activity, an increase in world stocks, and fluctuations in 
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exchange rates. However, according to Oxfam, the U.S. is the single biggest force driving 
down world prices (Watkins, 2002, p. 6). Because it is the world’s second-largest cotton 
producer (following China) and by far the largest exporter, the U.S. exerts a strong 
influence on the world cotton market. The U.S. spends $3.9 billion per year in subsidies 
to its cotton farmers, which enables them to reduce the price of sale and increase 
production. “If subsidies were curtailed in industrialized countries, cotton production 
would decline and world prices would increase” (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 5).  
The subsidies guarantee American cotton farmers a minimum price of 52 cents 
per pound, plus additional support. The money spent each year on U.S. subsidies is 10 
times the combined value of the cotton earnings of the three West African countries. The 
“mind-boggling subsidy of 100 percent … has enabled the US to capture 40 percent of 
world cotton exports at the expense of Third World growers” (Mail & Guardian, 2004).  
Some observers claim these subsidies are the only “comparative advantage” that U.S. 
cotton growers have, without which they could not compete internationally (Watkins, 
2003; Mutume, 2003). The cost of producing 1 kilogram of cotton in the United States is 
50 percent higher than in the West and Central African countries (WTO, 2003a, p. 3). 
The International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) estimates that withdrawing 
US subsidies would have raised the world cotton price by 11 cents per pound in 
production year 2001-2002 (ICAC, 2002, p. 8). (The ICAC consists of 43 country-
producing countries and aims to foster a healthy world cotton economy.) World Bank 
estimates put the potential increase at 12 cents per pound for 2000-2001, which would 
have provided West and Central African farmers revenue gains of $250 million a year 
(Badiane et al, 2002, p 13).   
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U.S. cotton subsidies for 2001-2002 cost Burkina Faso 12 percent of export 
earnings (1 percent of GDP), Mali 8 percent of export earnings (1.7 percent of GDP) and 
Benin 9 percent of export earnings (1.4 percent of GDP) (Watkins, 2002). By 
comparison, Mali lost nearly $43 million because of U.S. cotton subsidies, while 
receiving $37 million in US aid (Watkins, 2002). Debt relief granted to Benin and 
Burkina Faso will be less than the amount lost by the cotton sector (Hazard, 2002). If the 
cotton price was not distorted by subsidies, the number of people living in poverty in 
Burkina Faso could be halved in six years (Borger, 2002). Table 1 shows foreign 
exchange losses in the three countries as a result of U.S. subsidies. 
 
Table 1: Foreign exchange losses as a result of U.S. cotton subsidies ($ million) 
1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 1999/2000-
2001/2002 
 
Export 
value 
Loss 
of 
export 
value 
Export 
value 
Loss 
of 
export 
value 
Export 
value 
Loss 
of 
export 
value 
Export 
value 
Total 
cumulative 
loss of 
export 
earnings 
Benin 176 10 169 18 124 33 469 61 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
123 
 
7 
 
132 
 
14 
 
105 
 
28 
 
360 
 
49 
Mali 234 13 158 17 161 43 553 73 
 
*Table information from Watkins, 2003, Annex 6, using International Cotton Advisory Committee data. 
 
“There is no other American crop that causes more chaos and misery around the 
world,” said Ken Cook, president of the Environmental Working Group, which collects 
and analyzes data on American subsidies (Becker, 2003b). West African countries 
attempt to support their farmers with subsidies, but have nowhere near the resources of 
developed countries; in comparison, they spend $50-60 million per year (Dempster, 
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2003). This is money that could be invested in other critical sectors, such as health and 
education. “In Benin and Mali, governments are spending $20 million and $13 million 
respectively in an effort to put a price floor under the cotton market and prevent the 
wholesale collapse of the sector” (Watkins, 2003).  
Cotton has been subject to market and trade interventions for decades. One study 
estimated in the early 1990s that more than 90 percent of cotton was produced under 
some type of government intervention (World Bank, 2000). Yet, in the last decade, the 
West African governments have been encouraged by the World Bank and the IMF to 
withdraw from the sector.  In 2002, 73 percent of world cotton production was subsidised 
to some extent (ICAC, 2002, p. 4). The U.S. accounted for 63 percent of world cotton 
subsidies in 2002-2003 (Goreux, 2004, p. 11). 
This section has attempted to demonstrate the critical role cotton plays in the 
world economy, specifically for Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, and the negative impact 
of the U.S. subsidies. Understanding this dynamic helps lay the foundation for the issues 
covered in the rest of the paper, and sets the stage for the actions of the West Africans. 
 
3.2 The case of U.S. subsidies – overview and history 
 
The economic and political power of the U.S. allowed the government to increase 
subsidies to its cotton farmers, despite being a signatory to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (AOA), which committed members to reducing agriculture subsidies. 
Political inability to honour world trade regulations and agreements is considered a 
“prime reason why states do not comply with rules they initially agreed to” (Van den 
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Broek, 2003, p. 149). This section of the paper looks at the U.S. domestic factors the 
West Africans confronted in challenging U.S. policy.  
The cotton sector in the United States has received proportionally more support 
than most other commodities (Baffes, 2004a, p. 12). “U.S. cotton farmers receive more 
subsidies per capita and per acre than any other producer group in the country” (Watkins, 
2003). The average subsidy per pound of cotton between 1980 and 2002 was 19 cents, or 
one-third of the price farmers received  (Townsend, 2003).  The 2002 Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act increased this support. The $180 billion bill governs federal farm 
programs for six years and provides government subsidies for producers of several crops, 
including cotton. Among other payments, the bill established a minimum cotton price of 
52 cents a pound, guaranteeing support if world prices are lower. (World cotton prices in 
2001-2002 were 42 cents per pound.) 
The system of U.S. cotton subsidies has been described as “too big and complex 
to track” (Hancock, 2004). Cotton farmers are supported with the following mechanisms: 
direct payments (predetermined annual payments); counter-cyclical payments (previously 
known as emergency payments, when market prices fall below a stipulated level); a 
market price support instrument (guaranteeing government purchase at a floor price); and 
Step 2 payments (to bridge the gap when domestic prices exceed world prices, so that 
U.S. exports maintain their competitiveness) (Watkins, 2002, Box 1; Watkins, 2003; 
Baffes, 2004b, p. 5). Combining all the sources of revenue, it has been estimated that the 
bill ensures American cotton farmers about 70 cents per pound of cotton (Thurow and 
Kilman, 2002). Though frequently reported that U.S. cotton farmers receive $3.9 billion a 
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year under the Farm Bill, some suggest it is higher, once one adds in all types of support 
(Baffes, 2004a, p. vii). 
The U.S. General Accounting Office stated in a 1995 audit that “the cotton 
program has evolved over the past 60 years into a costly, complex maze of domestic and 
international price supports that benefit producers at great cost to the government and 
society. From 1986 through 1993, the cotton programs’ costs totaled $12 billion, an 
average of $1.5 billion a year. Moreover, the program is very complex, with dozens of 
key factors that interact and counteract to determine price, acreage, and payments and to 
restrict imports. The severe economic conditions and many of the motivations that led to 
the cotton program in the 1930s no longer exist” (Baffes, 2004b, p. 5). 
Like growers of most U.S. crops, cotton farmers produce so much more than the 
country can consume that they count on foreign customers for sales. In the 2002-2003 
season, 68 percent of US cotton was exported, at prices well below production costs 
(Baden, 2004, p. 1). U.S. growers exported cotton at 61 percent less than the cost of 
production in 2002 (IATP, 2004, p. 2).  “This system pits a typical Malian producer, 
farming two hectares of cotton, who is lucky to gross $400 a year, against US farms 
which receive a subsidy of $250 per hectare. The ten largest producers of the USA, 
whose government regularly preaches the virtues of free trade to developing countries, 
together pocket annual subsidy cheques for up to $17 million” (Baden, 2004, p. 1).  
Critics of the U.S. cotton subsidies say, without them, American cotton producers 
would not be viable exporters. They contend the United States is an inefficient, high-cost 
producer of cotton. Burkina Faso farmers produce a pound of cotton for 21 cents. The 
U.S. cost of production averages between 68 and 80 cents per pound. The U.S. cotton 
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subsidies do not cover production costs (IATP, 2004). “One of the ironies of the current 
situation, is how few farmers in the United States are surviving economically, despite the 
extremely high levels of producer support being paid” (Ritchie, et al, 2000, p. 4). Watkins 
contends that in an open market, one without subsidies, the U.S. would be losing market 
share to West and Central Africa (Watkins, 2003).  
The ICAC has said American cotton makes up for its inferior quality with its low 
price, due to government subsidies (Estur, 2003). Perhaps responding to criticism, the 
U.S. cotton lobby issued a paper two months after the Farm Bill was passed. The 
National Cotton Council (NCC) stated that most nations operate support programs for 
some agricultural products, and that the U.S. programs make easy targets because of their 
transparency. “The U.S. farm program is not the source of the ills in the world cotton 
industry. And, elimination of the U.S. farm program will not bring renewed prosperity to 
cotton producers elsewhere in the world” (NCC, 2002). The NCC argued there must be 
stronger world economic growth and greater demand for cotton, a goal toward which it 
had spent $60 million in marketing. The NCC said U.S. farmers needed subsidies because 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar damaged the competitiveness of the U.S. industry (NCC, 
2002). Appearing before the U.S. Congress in June 2003, NCC Chairman Bobby Greene 
said the notion that U.S. policies drive down world agricultural trade was “simply 
ludicrous” and “based on seriously flawed economics” (Kniazkov, 2003). 
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that subsidies encourage production of crops 
that, without support, might be abandoned. “Prices tend to follow the costs of most 
efficient producers, and it is expected that over time, those producers with higher costs 
would eventually reduce production. Yet, the experience of recent years shows that this 
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notion has been highly distorted by government subsidies in the cotton market. There is 
really no rational reason for a farmer to decrease cotton production or shift into profitable 
crops, in response to lower cotton prices, if his or her revenues are guaranteed by 
government aid” (de Lima-Campos, 2002). 
“The Farm Bill provoked enormous outrage in world trade circles. The 
contradictions between domestic politics and international trade policies could not be 
clearer. … The Farm Bill is clearly not beneficial for developing country producers. It 
will stimulate production in the US that is not warranted by market signals” (Malhotra, 
2003, p. 124, Box 5.5). 
The Farm Bill built on legislation developed over the preceding 60 years, and 
stemmed from 200 years of U.S. government support for farming. In George 
Washington’s 1796 message to Congress, he suggested that government support for 
agriculture was of primary importance to the national welfare (Commission on 21st 
Century Production Agriculture, 2001, p. 14). To develop the country’s farming capacity, 
the government supported land distribution and research to bolster productivity. “Thus 
Federal land policy created a precedent of Federal support for an independent family 
farm system, which has continued to be a prominent public goal of farm policy” (Effland, 
2000, p. 22). Effland noted that the assumption that fostering agriculture was a proper 
concern of government has remained essentially unquestioned. Baffes said the chief 
objective of U.S. farm bills is “transfer of resources from taxpayers (and to a lesser extent 
from consumers) to commodity producers” (Baffes, 2004b, p. 4). 
“The Farm Bill continues a long history of US government refusal to confront the 
lack of competition in its agricultural markets” (Malhotra, 2003, p. 124, Box 5.5). 
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American farmers during World War I were encouraged to increase production, and the 
resulting oversupply after the war caused a sharp drop in prices. During the Great 
Depression, farmers’ costs rose, while market prices for their crops stagnated. Demands 
for support for agriculture were “swept up” in the broader package of direct federal 
intervention of the New Deal (Effland, 2000, p. 24). Various pieces of legislation tried to 
remedy the problem, including the Agricultural Act of 1937, which made government 
price-support loans mandatory for corn, wheat and cotton. In its amended form, this act 
provided the framework for the farm programs in effect since that time. Starting in the 
1960s, price-support levels were lowered and farmers of cotton and other commodities 
were offered direct payments as compensation (Orden, 2002, p. 3) 
The 2002 bill was passed at a time when prices for major commodity crops were 
extremely and unusually low. World market prices for cotton were at their lowest level in 
30 years (42 cents per pound, compared to 72 cents per pound in the preceding 25 years). 
In a public statement two years later, the USDA said the U.S. agricultural economy had 
“sharply rebounded,” with prices received by farmers in April 2004 the highest for any 
month since the agency started keeping records in 1910 (USDA, 2004). The bill sets U.S. 
farm policy until 2008. 
This section has considered the U.S. domestic political factors influencing high 
levels of support for cotton farmers. Not only does the country have a history of 
supporting farmers, but it has a very influential cotton lobby. This point will be covered 
in the next section. 
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3.3 U.S. domestic political influences 
 
Governments use subsidies to ensure adequate food supplies and national self-
sufficiency. However, there are other factors at work. “There is also no doubt that in 
many Western democracies, agricultural interests have a political clout that gives them a 
decisive influence on the political lives of their countries” (Delcros, 2002, p. 220). This is 
true, Delcros says, in most countries where the electoral system is based on 
representation according to geographical criteria rather than the size of the population in 
given regions. “This is the case in the United States where the thinly populated states of 
the farm belt have as many senators as densely populated states” (Delcros, 2002, p. 220). 
This section discusses the political dynamics underlying the strong support for cotton 
producers. 
Congress writes U.S. farm policy. At the time the 2002 Farm Bill was passed, the 
two most powerful members of the House Agriculture Committee were from Texas, the 
source of a fifth of the nation’s cotton, and five U.S. senators from cotton states sat on the 
other chamber’s agriculture committee (Thurow and Kilman, 2002). The Economist 
underlined this point, stating that the WTO response to a proposal put forth by the West 
Africans to end U.S. cotton subsidies “had American fingerprints all over it. Political 
realities in Congress (the chairman of the Senate agriculture committee is a close ally of 
the cotton farmers) made American negotiators fiercely defensive of their outrageous 
subsidies” (Economist, 2003b).  
High levels of support to the cotton sector reflect the formidable power of the 
NCC, “arguably the most effective agricultural lobby in the industrialized world,” 
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(Watkins, 2003, p. 4). Watkins said “The NCC has welded different players in the cotton 
sector into a unified political force with immense clout at all levels of government.” A 
New York Times editorial noted: “Politically powerful farm lobbies in Japan, Europe and 
the United States are not willing to face global competition on fair terms. So agriculture 
remains the hypocritical asterisk to our fervent free-trade and free-enterprise creed” (New 
York Times, 2003b). 
While economists say the costs of protectionist trade policies exceed their 
benefits, groups that benefit from them – such as American cotton growers – are 
politically effective. “Politicians interested in re-election will most likely respond to the 
demands for protectionist legislation of such an interest group” (Coughlin, et al, 1991, p. 
32). Political contributions from agribusiness rose from $37 million in 1992 to $53 
million in 2002, according to the Center for Responsive Politics (Becker, 2003a). “The 
government serves simply as the agent for all of these interests while pursuing a trade 
policy consistent with its own survival or electability” (Ray, 1991, p. 341). Ray argues 
that special interest groups thwart the drive to liberalize world trade (Ray, 1991, p. 352).  
Critics such as the nongovernmental organization Oxfam cite the failure of the 
U.S. government to respond to “one of the starkest examples of the rigged trade rules,” 
and a willingness to jeopardize the multilateral system over the issue of cotton. “It 
demonstrates that US trade policy is vulnerable to small but powerful domestic lobbies 
with friends in high places, and is shockingly indifferent to poverty in Africa” (Baden, 
2004, p. 2). 
From taxpayers’ perspective, the subsidies do not make sense. The cost of cotton 
subsidies exceeds the value of the country’s cotton exports. Yet, “they are very profitable 
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to small power groups which have been able to lobby with great effectiveness, while 
there is no organized constituency for reducing the costs of cotton subsidies which are 
thinly spread among hundreds of millions of taxpayers” (Goreux, 2004, p. 9). 
Delcros wrote that many Western democracies remain attached to the cultural, 
social and historical values that agriculture perpetuates. “In the United States people still 
cherish the image of the pioneer farming families who settled the vast expanses of 
America. The rise to power of the “family farming” association demonstrates the strength 
of this feeling” (Delcros, 2002, p. 220). In fact, most Americans do not support farm 
subsidies on a regular annual basis, and fewer are in favour of doing so for large farming 
businesses, which are the primary recipients (PIPA, 2004, p. 3). Unknown to most 
Americans, however, the U.S. policy has shifted from primarily helping farmers on a 
contingency basis with price supports in bad years to making guaranteed payments on a 
regular annual basis (in addition to price supports). 
IPE scholars cite the clash between domestic autonomy and international norms. 
“Although the resolution of this issue will be known only with the passage of time, the 
shifting attitudes and policies of the major centers of economic power toward 
international regimes suggests that domestic priorities are triumphing over international 
norms” (Gilpin, 1987, p. 389). Ray described a U.S. “policy drift” resulting from a 
conflict between national principles and the pressures generated by special interest 
groups (Ray, 1991, p. 340).  He argued that protectionist policies “present a sharp 
contrast to the trade liberalization stance that the United States has professed for the last 
fifty years” (Ray, 1991, p. 343). 
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Hence, the United States bolsters support for its cotton farmers. At the same time, 
the international institutions it backs – the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO – have 
pressed the West African states to move to a free-market model. As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, the governments of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali started this shift in 
the mid-'90s, following decades in which they artificially set the prices paid to their 
cotton farmers, both subsidizing and taxing them.  
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Chapter 4. Cotton production in West Africa 
 
The preceding chapter looked at the international and U.S. domestic factors that 
allowed for increased U.S. cotton subsidies at a time when international trade advocates 
were pushing for their removal. Power dynamics and domestic political concerns set the 
stage for the confrontation between the U.S. and Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. To 
appreciate the motive and strategy behind the West Africans’ campaign, however, it is 
helpful to consider the history and evolution of their cotton sector.  
Cotton is one of the rare agricultural products for which Africa’s share of world 
exports has increased. Production in West and Central Africa has increased fivefold since 
the early 1980s, rising from 200,000 tons to almost 1 million tons (WTO, 2003a), and the 
region’s share in world cotton exports more than doubled in the '90s (Levin, 1999). 
Nearly all of the cotton produced in the region is for export, to Southeast Asia, Europe 
and Latin America. The region is the world’s second-largest exporter, capturing roughly 
15 percent of world market share.  
In West Africa, cotton is generally far more profitable than alternative crops and 
accounts for a large share of rural employment and exports, generating a significant 
portion of government revenue. The national cotton sectors would be profitable if the 
international price exceeded 50 cents per pound; few other countries can produce cotton 
profitably at this price level (Badiane et al, 2002, p. 12). The principal source of the 
region’s comparative advantage on the international cotton market is the predominant use 
of unpaid family labour (Bingen, 1998, p. 275). West African cotton is grown primarily 
for export, not for domestic textile use. “This strong dependence on the global market 
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makes the cotton industry and, as a consequence, the economies of many African 
countries particularly sensitive to fluctuations of the market” (Estur, 2003). 
An initiative presented by the three countries plus Chad to the WTO in May 2003 
noted that the industry’s success was the result of “substantial investment and 
restructuring of the cotton sector over the past two decades” (WTO, 2003a, p. 2). From 
1999/2000 to 2001/2002, production increased by 14 percent but export earnings fell by 
31 percent due to the low price on the world market (WTO, 2003a, p. 4). The cotton-
producing countries are recognized for having undertaken substantial policy reforms 
during the 1990s. The four countries stated in their initiative that the cotton sector is an 
encouraging example of reform and restructuring. It said they had worked with 
international financing agencies and other institutions to restructure state marketing 
bodies, provide better loan mechanisms for farmers and introduce competition to the 
sector. 
The development of the sector has resulted in consistently good quality cotton, 
high average crop yields and high ginning ratios (ginning is the process of separating 
cotton seeds from the lint). The World Bank attributes these results to several factors: 
application of appropriate soil nutrient replenishment, pest management and seed 
varieties well-suited to local conditions; the provision (by the government and/or cotton 
companies) of support services and infrastructure; guaranteed producer prices and output 
markets; high input-credit recovery rates; and well-organized village-level associations 
(Badiane, et al, 2002, p. 9). 
The boost in production occurred under a tightly regulated government-run 
system, a system that is gradually being dismantled. “Until the last few seasons, all 
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Francophone West African countries retained a state-controlled, single-channel cotton 
market system. These systems delivered a comprehensive range of services to producers 
but were accused of being inefficient and high cost and hence depressing seed cotton 
prices paid to producers. Reform is now proceeding gradually in a number of countries, 
driven by intense pressure from the World Bank, among others” (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 
37). Because the model was successful in facilitating growth in the cotton sector, the 
challenge is to implement reforms that retain its advantages while eliminating the 
drawbacks (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 8). 
The next section describes the history and evolution of cotton production in West 
Africa. It is helpful to understand the experience of the farmers and the states, in order to 
appreciate why and how they are challenging the U.S. cotton subsidies.  
 
4.1 History and evolution 
 
West Africa had a history of indigenous cotton production long before 
colonialisation. In the early part of the 20th century, France sought to bolster the export 
cotton market in its colonies to provide cotton for its textile industry. The U.S. Civil War 
and resulting cotton supply crisis from 1861-1865 showed French industrialists they were 
dependent on the U.S. as their primary source of cotton, and at the mercy of fluctuating 
world market supplies and prices. This section traces the development and evolution of 
the cotton export industry that stemmed from the French interests. 
Following World War II, the colonial states and French companies aimed to 
construct an institutional structure that would increase producer prices, to give peasants 
an incentive to grow cotton (Bassett, 2001, p. 86). A secondary aim was to improve the 
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standard of living of cotton growers. France created the Compagnie Française pour le 
Développement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT) in 1949. A World Bank report described the 
creation of state-owned companies in individual countries in which CFDT retained a 
minority shareholding, usually up to 40 percent. These companies operated under a 
monopoly system that gave them control over the marketing and ginning of seed cotton, 
the export of lint and cottonseed, the import and distribution of inputs, and the provision 
of services to cotton growers such as extension, credit and transport. Under the system, a 
single national buying price for cotton was determined per country per season before 
planting. “The tightly controlled system succeeded in rapidly expanding cotton 
production, which in most cases has been the only commercial crop available to small-
holder farmers” (World Bank, 2002a, p. 1).  
The parastatals provided seeds, inputs (i.e. fertilizer), credit, transportation, 
ginning and marketing services (Levin, 1999). In some cases, they also organized public 
services not directly linked to cotton, such as health and schooling (Goreux and Macrae, 
2003, p. 8). The strength of the system was that it ensured the provision of inputs on 
credit, because cotton producers sold their crops back to the same entity that provided 
inputs at the beginning of the season. “The comprehensive and efficient input-credit 
system has been largely responsible for the rapid expansion of cotton cultivation by poor 
farmers … and it is a key feature which has to be preserved” (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, 
p. 8). This vertically-integrated system is credited with increasing yields per hectare, 
increasing area cultivated per grower and expanding the number of growers, in contrast to 
the relatively poorer performance of Anglophone Africa (Bassett, 2001, p. 1-2). The 
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system also granted the Francophone countries access to a regional network of research 
and marketing and the benefits of economies of scale. 
The cotton industries in Francophone West Africa were profitable through the 
mid-'80s, when world market prices for cotton fell. This reached a crisis in the early '90s, 
when a number of initial reforms were introduced (Levin, 1999). The countries benefited 
from the 1994 devaluation of the CFA, which increased the value of their cotton exports. 
During this period, the states continued the legacy of the French, providing subsidised 
inputs and guaranteed markets for rural farmers, which limited the impact of world 
market fluctuations on farmers (Harsch, 2000, p. 10). But, international financial 
institutions and donors, in particular the World Bank and the IMF, pushed the 
governments of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali to liberalise their markets, and to reduce 
the role of the state in the cotton industry.  
The parastatal system was criticised for being inefficient, in some cases corrupt, 
and in all cases, for underpaying the producers. In other words, the state taxed them. 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, West African cotton growers typically received 
less than half of the world market price for cotton lint (Bassett, 2001, p. 159). “West 
African cotton growers were consistently underpaid for their labor product. Their efforts 
to make cotton work agronomically and commercially did not benefit them as much as it 
should have” (Bassett, 2001, p. 159). For example, in 1994-1995, when world cotton 
prices reached their peak, producers received only 30 percent of the world price (Goreux 
and Macrae, 2003, p. 8). 
Bates reviewed many African states that had state-owned agencies serving as the 
single buyer of commodities. All his examples were Anglophone, except for Senegal, and 
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he did not focus on cotton, though he said the pattern prevailed throughout much of 
Francophone Africa. These agencies, “bequeathed to the governments of the independent 
states by their colonial predecessors, purchase cash crops for export at administratively 
determined domestic prices, and then sell them at the prevailing world market prices” 
(Bates, 1981, p. 12). These agencies, Bates argued, used their market power to keep the 
price paid to the farmer below the price set by the world market, and thus accumulate 
funds. This foreign exchange was often invested in social and industrial development 
programs. By using this system, “the states have therefore made the producers of cash 
crops a significant part of their tax base, and have taken resources from them without 
compensation in the form of interest payments or of goods and services returned” (Bates, 
1981, p. 19). The producers “have been subject to a pricing policy that reduces the prices 
they receive to a level well below world market prices” (Bates, 1981, p. 28).  
Bassett showed that cotton farmers’ incomes steadily declined from 1970 to 1994 
and that they received a relatively small share of the market value of their crop, while 
profits were accruing to other agents, such as input suppliers, cotton traders and the 
marketing boards (Bassett, 2001, p. 180). “The prices West African producers receive 
tend to be very low… A large part of the gap between domestic and export prices of 
cotton has been absorbed by governments in the form of various taxes” (Baffes, 2004a, p. 
26). 
A 1998 World Bank report said cotton prices received by farmers in Francophone 
West Africa were low because of high state taxes, high cotton company profits, mistakes 
in marketing, subsidization of domestic textile mills and low returns from domestic use of 
cotton seed. Levin described an exchange at an ICAC meeting during which the World 
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Bank criticised the monopolistic policies of state cotton companies that “put farmers last, 
while putting the cotton companies and the government treasury first” (Levin, 1999, p. 2-
3). 
The determination of annual cotton prices reflects the relative bargaining power 
of a number of groups, such as producers, governments, the CFDT and private ginning 
firms (Baffes, 2004a, p. 26). During the late 1990s, producer representatives began to 
play an increasingly political role, and lobbied for higher producer prices (Gillson, 2004, 
P. 37). “Farmers were not oblivious to the dynamics of capital accumulation occurring at 
their expense” (Bassett, 2001, p. 159). Cotton strikes in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
early '90s demonstrated that the 30-year-old model of cotton production and marketing 
was in a state of transition (Bassett, 2001, p. 168). “Cotton farmers not only spoke in a 
forceful voice … but, more importantly, they now possessed the organizational strength 
to speak even more loudly through collective action” (Bassett, 2001, p. 168). 
Bassett focused on Côte d’Ivoire, but his observations extend throughout West 
Africa, including Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. Bassett said the World Bank challenged 
the CFDT system, believing it to impede economic growth and depress farmer incomes 
(Bassett, 2001, p. 172). The system was also confronted, he said, “by cotton grower 
organizations which assumed unprecedented power in setting administered prices and in 
cotton marketing” (Bassett, 2001, p. 172). “Unlike in the 1960s …, in the 1990s the 
French firm and its African partners had to consider the objectives and resources of 
peasant cotton growers” (Bassett, 2001, p. 173). 
Bassett argued that economic liberalisation, pushed by the international financial 
institutions, created a chance for farmers to redefine their relationship with the CFDT and 
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the state, and to influence agricultural policies (Bassett, 2001, p. 170). These rural farmer 
organizations “emerged, in part, in the space opened up by political and economic 
reforms initiated by the Ivorian government to deal with its fiscal and political crises 
under pressure from the World Bank and IMF” (Bassett, 2001, p. 184).  Bassett cited the 
“growing power of tens of thousands of small farmers who, through producer 
organizations, continued to press for a higher share of the export price of cotton lint” in 
the mid- to late-'90s (Bassett, 2001, p. 181). Gillson (2004) said the combination of 
external and internal pressure made it widely accepted within Francophone countries that 
producers should receive 50-60 percent of the world price of cotton, which would put 
their domestic prices more in line with international prices than in the past. Figure 3 
shows the producer price as a percentage of export price in each of the three countries, 
from the 1994-1995 season to the 2001-2002 season. 
 
Figure 3: Producer price as percentage of export price, 1995-2002 
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*Chart information from Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 50. 
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Over time, the parastatals became “crippled” by huge debts and either went 
bankrupt or stayed alive with state infusions of capital (Baffes, 2004a, p. ix). Reforms 
were the only feasible alternative. Given these conditions, and under pressure to qualify 
for aid assistance and debt relief, the countries adopted the approach prescribed by the 
international financial institutions, to varying degrees of success. However, the policies 
pushed by the World Bank during the 1990s were not entirely beneficial for growers. 
“The surging number of indebted cotton growers and the drop in agricultural equipment 
sales testify to the recessionary impact of the World Bank’s economic policies during this 
period” (Bassett, 2001, p. 180). 
The CFDT and its partner West African cotton companies cited the risks of 
privatising, and tried to persuade the World Bank that the future of the West African 
cotton sector hinged on the CFDT system. The CFDT director of rural development 
argued that peasant farmers were dependent upon its vertically integrated structure to 
ensure access to credit, inputs and equipment. “If this structure was allowed to be 
dismantled, he stated, the cotton sector would fall apart and rural livelihoods would be 
jeopardized” (Bassett, 2001, p. 171). Those holding this view pointed to the impact of 
privatisation on Anglophone countries, such as Nigeria, where cotton production had 
been variable and contrasted with the steady growth in production in Francophone 
countries (Levin, 1999). “Liberalization of markets for fertilizers and other inputs could 
bring a reduction in cotton yields if prices are raised higher than farmers can afford, says 
Jean-Luc Lecorre, deputy director of the Africa Merchant Bank. ‘For such a highly 
integrated sector, the risks of privatization are many.’” (Harsch, 2000, p.10).  
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A 2002 World Bank research paper listed the principal steps to reforming the 
cotton sectors in West Africa as 1) spinning off to the private sector the non-core 
activities of the cotton parastatals, 2) reinforcing the technical and commercial capacities 
of farmer associations and 3) introducing competition by opening up the sector to private 
ginneries. Yet, a 2003 review of reforms in the cotton sectors in some African countries, 
including those in West Africa, advised that the sector needed to be liberalised cautiously 
because cotton is an annual crop requiring large investments that have to be amortised 
over many years (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 42). Goreux and Macrae said it was too 
often assumed that once parastatals were dismantled and prices liberalised, the private 
sector would step in to automatically fill up the vacuum, but that was not always the case. 
Oxfam said the efforts to liberalise domestic cotton sectors, for example abolishing state 
marketing boards, which were often done at the instigation of the international financial 
institutions, had been “mixed” (Oxfam, 2004a). 
Despite general trends toward liberalisation in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, 
they differed in the approaches and extent of reform. The next section of the paper looks 
at the individual experiences of the three countries, and their efforts to bolster their 
respective cotton industries through domestic reforms. Of the three countries, Benin has 
been the most aggressive in liberalising (it is also the one whose economy is most heavily 
dependent on cotton), with Mali having the furthest to go. The following sections 
describe those efforts, and their results.  Table 2 provides a comparison of the growth of 
each country’s cotton sector from 1995 to 2001. 
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Table 2: Growth of cotton sectors in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali from 1995-2002 
 
Year Base of comparison Benin Burkina 
Faso 
Mali 
1994-1995 Area cultivated ('000 ha) 230 184 270 
2001-2002  330 356 505 
 Percentage growth 43 93 87 
     
1994-1995 Yields of seed cotton/ha (kg) 1157 777 1085 
2001-2002  1258 1063 1129 
 Percentage growth 9 37 4 
     
1994-1995 Production of seed cotton ('000 m tons) 266 143 293 
2001-2002  415 378 570 
 Percentage growth 56 164 95 
     
1994-1995 Producer price/kg of fibre, w/ bonus (CFA) 363 253 310 
2001-2002  474 477 476 
 Percentage growth 31 89 54 
 
*Table information from Goreux and Macrae, 2003, pp. 44-47. Percentage calculations by author. 
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4.2 Benin 
 
Of the three countries, Benin has been the most aggressive in liberalising its 
cotton industry. During the '80s and '90s, Benin was the most successful West African 
country in expanding its cotton sector. One of the smallest producers in Africa in 1980, 
Benin is today the largest exporter in the region. Among the world’s producers of seed 
cotton, Benin has moved up from 19th (1998) to 13th (2002) place (WTO, 2004a, p. 62). 
The cotton subsector accounts for 77 percent of exports and 13 percent of GDP (WTO, 
2004a).   
This growth has had far-reaching effects. “Given that agriculture is the main 
occupation of 76 percent of Benin workforce, the strong performance of the agriculture 
had a widespread impact on incomes and therefore on the ability of people to command 
access to food” (Marcos, 1999).  During this growth period, the state controlled cotton 
production; farmers sold to the state, which determined the price. Benin was successful in 
boosting growth mainly because it devoted substantial public resources to agricultural 
investment, research and extension, and provided farmers with strong and stable price 
incentive through public marketing arrangements. “This eventually proved to be fiscally 
unsustainable. The challenge facing Benin is to maintain the momentum of equitable 
agricultural development under a more market-oriented policy regime in which the public 
sectors play a less prominent role” (Marcos, 1999). 
Benin is widely recognized for having made real strides toward liberalisation, a 
process begun by a 1989 adjustment strategy, and followed up with concrete actions. 
Starting in 1992, one private company was established to provide inputs, followed by a 
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second one in 1993 and a third in 1994, and private investors gained increasingly more 
market shares in the input market (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 11). During this period, 
more private ginneries were built. According to the World Bank, “Benin has made 
significant progress in introducing far-reaching reforms which, if pursued, would put the 
country’s cotton sector on a solid path to long-term growth and increase considerably its 
contribution to poverty reduction in its rural areas” (World Bank, 2002a, p. 1). 
The World Bank credited the Beninois government for lifting the monopoly of the 
national cotton company, Société Nationale pour la Promotion Agricole (SONAPRA), 
over the marketing of seed cotton and for introducing measures to increase competition in 
the input sector. “The government has announced … its determination to work toward 
enhancing its regulatory role while gradually empowering the private sector and building 
the capacity of producer organizations” (World Bank, 2002a, p.2). 
It was a balancing act to remove the government support system, upon which 
cotton producers were dependent, and “wean” them onto the private sector. The industry 
had to find alternative mechanisms for financing inputs (seeds, tools) and providing 
support services. A 1998 report by the IMF discussed the early stages of partial 
liberalisation, which did not expose private operators to market conditions and thus did 
not result in the expected increase in productivity (IMF, 1998). Yet, the government 
continued with incremental steps, as it was “confident that this strategy will serve 
producers and Benin’s economy well” (IMF, 1998), and the private sector responded. 
The crop year of 1998-99 was the year of transition from administered to market-
determined prices.  The government and its partners undertook several steps to enable the 
transition (IMF, 1998; World Bank, 2002a; WTO, 2004a). In 1999, the private sector 
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created the Association Interprofessionnelle du Coton to help with extension services, 
cotton research, seed multiplication and distribution, quality control and road 
maintenance. Farmers’ associations established a countrywide purchasing cooperative to 
which, in 1999, the government transferred responsibility for purchasing and distribution 
of inputs. 
The monopoly held by SONAPRA on cotton marketing ended in June 2000. This 
change also presented risks. IFPRI in 2001 noted that the SONAPRA buying monopoly 
had provided a mechanism for farmers to purchase fertilizer on credit and repay during 
harvest. “Liberalisation of cotton marketing might well improve marketing efficiency and 
raise farm prices, but it could threaten the sustainability of the input credit system. Efforts 
to reform the cotton sector in Benin are focusing on devising alternative institutional 
mechanisms to ensure loan repayment” (IFPRI, 2001).  
In 2000, Benin created the Centrale de Sécurisation des Paiements et des 
Recouvrements (CSPR), a clearinghouse for all financial transactions dealing with the 
sale of cotton inputs and cotton. The CSPR is intended to ensure that input credits are 
recovered and payments are made in a timely fashion, thereby preserving a benefit from 
the old system (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 20). At the beginning of the 2000-2001 
crop year, the government fully liberalised the purchase of seed cotton to allow all 
ginning companies to compete. Several private ginning companies now exist, although 
they buy agreed quotas of seed cotton at an administratively fixed price (Gillson, et al, 
2004, p. 37).  
A 2003 IMF press release discussed ongoing steps to “enhance” cotton sector 
reform in Benin, such as privatisation of SONAPRA. In 2002, stakeholders drew up a 
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program for privatising SONAPRA, including retaining 34 percent of shares for the state 
and selling the remaining to private sources (WTO, 2004a, p. 64). Yet, a March 2004 
IMF press release noted that privatisation of the public ginning company, a “key element 
of the structural reform agenda,” had incurred further delays. Though Benin reformed its 
sector, the sequence of measures was not always well designed and the sector remains 
heavily regulated (Goreux and Macrae, 2003). For example, producer prices are fixed for 
the entire country and announced at the beginning of the marketing season. The 
government has the final word in the price. 
Nonetheless, Benin’s efforts have been lauded by international financial 
institutions and donors. A 1997 WTO review noted “Benin was commended on the 
institutional reforms and positive macroeconomic performance since 1990. These had 
been reflected in solid economic growth, improved public finances and a modest rate of 
inflation. … Members appreciated the considerable steps taken by Benin to liberalize its 
import markets and to reduce export restrictions.” Benin was urged to continue its trade 
liberalisation and to “embed it within the rules and principles of the multilateral trading 
system” (WTO, 1997). A 2000 Canadian International Development Agency document 
noted “Donors believe that Benin is carrying out fundamental reforms of its political, 
economic and institutional sectors. The government continues to act to ensure that the 
difficult transition from centralized to market economy succeeds.” The IMF and World 
Bank in March 2003 announced Benin’s eligibility for debt relief, which “reflects the 
government’s strong record of reform” and “commitments to structural reforms and 
macroeconomic stability” (IRIN, 2003b). A 2004 WTO review lauded “the authorities’ 
commitment to pursue structural reform without delay” (WTO 2004a, p. xi). 
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Benin’s president from 1972-1991 was Mathieu Kérékou, who nationalised 
industries and under whose rule the country’s balance of trade deteriorated (Decalo, 
1997, p. 48-50). By 1988, international financial institutions feared the country would 
default on its loans and pressured Kérékou to make financial reforms, which he began. In 
1991, Kérékou was replaced by Nicéphore Soglo, an economist and former World Bank 
officer, who was strongly supported by the World Bank (Decalo, 1997, p. 54). “Abroad, 
Soglo’s main merits have been seen as steadfast resistance against societal and 
parliamentary pressures to moderate the harsh economic policies of fiscal stringency 
needed to stabilize Benin” (Decalo, 1997, p. 59). Soglo gradually became unpopular as 
austerity measures reduced living standards and many civil servants lost their jobs. 
Soglo’s approach put him into conflict with members of the country’s National 
Assembly, highlighted by an August 1994 incident in which he rejected a moderate 
budget put forth by the National Assembly as incompatible with austerity pledges made 
to the IMF. Soglo lacked support to pass his own budget, so he promulgated it by decree, 
a move thrown out by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional (Decalo, 1997, p.59). 
Parliamentarians claimed that Benin was totally “under [IMF] control” (Decalo, 1997, p. 
59). Voters removed him from office in 1996 and replaced him with Kerekou, who was 
re-elected in 2001. 
Soglo’s background with the World Bank undoubtedly influenced Benin’s 
aggressive liberalisation and helps explain why, of the three West African countries, 
Benin initially moved the farthest toward privatising the cotton sector. This approach has 
continued under Kerekou.  A cotton consultant in Mali offered two other reasons why 
Benin liberalised most quickly of the three countries. At the time Benin began privatising 
 50
SONAPRA, he said, the country’s economy was not as dependent on cotton as Mali’s 
was, so it was easier to make the transition. Also, he said, Benin did not have negative 
experiences with privatisation, whereas Mali had two (railroads, electricity), so it was 
more difficult to generate support for the idea (Dembélé, 2004). 
Yet, the transition has not been entirely smooth. The managing director for Fludor 
Benin, a company that produces oil from cottonseeds, said the country had difficulty 
finding the right level of government intervention, because it came out of a Marxist 
system based on total state planning to enter directly into a “so called liberal” system 
(Riboux, 2004). Furthermore, Riboux said, “Benin is dependent on different financial 
donors whom she strives to please. This explains …why the privatization of the cotton 
sector is such a chaos.”  In 2002, the government subsidised the cotton sector with $30 
million, but “could not continue the following years because of the veto of IMF and the 
World Bank” (Riboux, 2004). 
Benin’s cotton industry and, therefore, the country’s economy is at risk. A March 
2003 IMF press release said that the country’s external account deficit had widened as a 
result of a sharp drop in the world cotton price (IMF, 2003). It cited the danger of Benin’s 
dependence on a single commodity, and a June 2004 WTO trade policy review noted that 
Benin’s reforms had not enabled a reduction of its dependence on cotton exports (WTO, 
2004a). 
The Beninois newspaper La Nation published a piece by Riboux in September 
2002 in which he said the 2001-2002 cotton season was a historical record in terms of 
quantity (415,000 tons of seed cotton). “However, from the economic and financial 
viewpoint, it is probably one of the worst years” (Riboux, 2002). Riboux cited a number 
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of problems, including the low world cotton price, late commercialization that season, 
and delayed payments from CSPR. The IMF prevents the Beninois government from 
subsidizing the sector, he said, but Benin would not need subsidies under normal 
circumstances because its production is among the most competitive in the world. Riboux 
said the international market was depressed because “the Americans are making an 
unrestrained dumping” of cotton lint, and argued that Benin and other African countries 
should be compensated for the damages they were suffering. He said the number of 
people giving up cotton farming was increasing, some because they had not been paid 
and some because they did not know what price they would be paid. “If this tendency 
sustains, it will then be the activity in which Benin excels that will disappear” (Riboux, 
2002). 
This section has described the efforts of the Beninois to reform the country’s 
cotton sector in line with the requests of international financial institutions and donors. 
While Benin is recognized for having made substantial changes, the industry is 
considered to be at risk. The country’s dependence on cotton exports makes it especially 
vulnerable when the world cotton price is low. The next section considers the case of 
Burkina Faso. 
 
4.3 Burkina Faso  
 
Though not as aggressive as Benin, Burkina Faso has made efforts to liberalise its 
economy. As in Benin, cotton is Burkina Faso’s main export crop. In 2002, 57 percent of 
the country’s export revenue came from cotton (Mutume, 2003). The country is one of 
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the cheapest cotton producers, with farmers able to produce one pound for 21 cents.  
Agriculture employs more than 80 percent of the country’s labour force and generates 60 
percent of export proceeds (IMF, 1999).  
Cotton production in the 2004 season was almost double that of 1998 and the 
country achieved “new records” in cotton production (WTO, 2004b, pp. vii, 52).  “Some 
observers see the Burkina sector as the best performing of the Francophone sectors at 
present” (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 38). The boost in production is attributed to changes in 
the sector that have allowed for an increase in areas sown (WTO, 2004b, p. 58). 
A 2004 WTO trade policy review credited authorities with having prioritised the 
completion of ongoing structural reforms and “underlined” the country’s steps toward 
reforming the cotton subsector, described as “the cornerstone” of Burkina’s economy.  
“Compared to most other African countries, however, Burkina Faso came relatively late 
to ‘orthodox’ structural adjustment” (FAO, 1996). Preparations for a World Bank-
supported structural adjustment program began in 1988, and the country signed a 
structural adjustment program with the IMF in 1991. According to the FAO, Burkina 
Faso is unique from many other countries in that the country was not in a critical 
macroeconomic situation when it undertook the policy changes, so it was able to 
carefully prepare for the program. 
By 1996, the government had begun to liberalise trade and lift administrative 
obstacles to exports (FAO, 1996). Economic growth was slower than hoped for, though 
there was an increase in cotton exports. A 1998 WTO report said Burkina Faso should 
continue to scale down state intervention in the production and marketing of its major 
exports; and that more extensive trade liberalisation efforts were needed to promote 
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exports for sustainable economic growth. “State intervention in production and 
particularly in the marketing of certain products, especially cotton, … all raise doubts 
concerning the relevance to the objectives of diversification and promotion of exports on 
the one hand and improving the living conditions of the rural population on the other” 
(WTO, 1998). The report acknowledged that liberalising reforms had been undertaken for 
the import sector, but said a great deal remained to be done for exports. It cited examples 
of high transport costs, due to landing and handling fees at Ouagadougou airport, and the 
state monopoly of supply and distribution of energy. Nonetheless, the report concluded 
that Burkina Faso is “pursuing its economic liberalization program unflinchingly.” 
A 1998 Strategic Orientation Document prepared by the government set goals to 
be accomplished by 2010, including refocusing the role of the state and promoting the 
private sector’s role in agriculture (FAO, 1998). The FAO said “the implementation of 
these measures attests to the government’s commitment to having government 
departments withdraw from all activities involving the production, marketing and supply 
of inputs and credit” (FAO, 1998).  
Under the presidency of Blaise Compaoré (since 1987), the government privatised 
public companies. Compaoré “pledged allegiance to the capitalist system,” seeking 
economic growth and the development of capitalism, but “not at the expense of the 
Burkinabè people” (Boudon, 1997, p. 138). Compaoré has been vocal in criticizing U.S. 
cotton subsidies through the media and at the WTO, which will be discussed later in the 
paper. He has been backed by a very strong National Union of Cotton Producers of 
Burkina Faso. 
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Goreux and Macrae said the management of the cotton sector improved with 
limited reforms in the late 1990s after growers gained more power (Goreux and Macrae, 
2003, p v). The union restricted access to growers’ associations to actual growers. 
Producers organised themselves into a system with various layers of representation, from 
the village level to the department level to the provincial union level, up to the country’s 
textile fibres company, Société des Fibres et Textiles du Burkina (SOFITEX). Evidence 
of their organisation and activism was demonstrated at a press conference the producers’ 
union held in Ouagadougou on 5 September 2003, just before the WTO meeting. A 
delegation of 12 cotton producers joined the union vice president to present their Minister 
of Trade with a petition bearing nearly 80,000 signatures of protestors against U.S. cotton 
subsidies. “Our action, as well as being symbolic, is a heartfelt cry of thousands of cotton 
producers who live from the sweat of their brown, and whose survival, as well as that of 
future generations, depends on cotton,” said François Tani, union vice president (Baden, 
2004, p. 7, Box 1). 
In 1999, an agreement was signed between SOFITEX and the National Union of 
Cotton Producers that, among other things, allowed producers to own up to 30 percent of 
the capital of SOFITEX.  Producers now have a majority of the seats on the SOFITEX 
board, which reviews input bids, chooses distributors and fixes the floor price for 
purchasing. “As a result, the growers’ association became a stronger partner able to 
negotiate with ginners and other stakeholders” (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. v). The 
state is a minority shareholder (35 percent). 
The cotton industry remains under the control of SOFITEX, which controls the 
provision of inputs and other services to farmers, operates as the sole buyer of the entire 
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cotton crop, and is responsible for ginning and marketing (Badiane, et al, 2002; WTO, 
2004b). Nonetheless, while the single-channel marketing system has been retained, 
farmers have a greater say in how the system is run (Gillson et al, 2004). SOFITEX is to 
be privatised “in the long term” but “remains the leading operator in the subsector 
because of its monopoly on the collection of seed cotton … and of the initial processing 
of cotton … as well as the marketing of cotton fibre” (WTO, 2004b, p. xi). A floor price 
is announced before each sowing. If a profit is made at this price, producers receive a 
bonus the following season. In each of the seven crop years up to 2001-2002, producers 
received a bonus that represented on average 15 percent of the floor price (Goreux and 
Macrae, 2003, p. 32). 
In February 2004, a consortium of European banks announced they would invest 
$78 million into Burkina Faso’s “booming” cotton sector, citing the sound financial 
record of SOFITEX. SOFITEX increased the price it paid producers from 185 CFA per 
kilo in the 2003/2004 planting season to 210 CFA per kilo in the 2004/2005 planting 
season as an incentive to raise output. The company hoped to raise cotton production by 
20 percent, by better use of fertilizers and pesticides to improve yields. SOFITEX and the 
National Union of Cotton Producers said the European investment would ensure that 
everyone involved in the industry would be paid (IRIN, 2004). Production in Burkina 
Faso increased more than four-fold after the government launched a campaign to boost 
the cotton sector in 1996 and farmers earned eight times more from selling their crop than 
they did 10 years previously (IRIN, 2004). 
In both Benin and Burkina Faso, growers received a greater share of world prices 
in the period from 1998-1999 to 2001-2002 than they did between 1994-1995 through 
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1997-1998, presumably due to the domestic reforms in their sector. The price received by 
Benin’s producers increased from 45 to 62 percent of the world price, and for Burkina 
Faso from 39 to 57 percent (Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 28). However, world prices 
dropped from the earlier to the later periods, so growers received a greater share of a 
lower price. 
As Burkina Faso and Benin have liberalised their cotton sectors, the percentage of 
the world price earned by cotton producers has increased. Thus, the producers have a 
direct interest in supporting trade practices to keep the world price up. Their role, and that 
of the Malian producers, in challenging U.S. subsidies will be covered later in the paper. 
The next section looks at the evolution of the cotton sector in Mali, where the pace of 
liberalisation has lagged behind that of the other two countries. 
 
4.4 Mali 
 
Of the three countries, Mali has made the least progress toward liberalising, 
though it was the first to commit to structural adjustment and has been under “intense 
pressure” from the World Bank and others (Gillson et al, 2004, p. 39). The WTO 2004 
trade policy review of Mali noted that efforts made by the state to withdraw from key 
activities should be “underlined,” but advised that the country would “increase the 
confidence of economic operators by completing the reforms under way.” Mali’s cotton 
producers have a long (and, perhaps, the best documented) history of activism. It could 
be because of this that Mali’s shift toward liberalisation is moving relatively slowly, with 
the farmers having an active say in how it transpires.  
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Cotton is the principal cash crop for Mali’s farmers, although gold has displaced 
its role as the country’s top export earner. In 2002, cotton accounted for 18 percent of 
export earnings. Cotton production reached a record level of 600,000 tons in the 2003-
2004 season, an increase of 37 percent over the previous year, making Mali the largest 
producer of seed cotton in Africa that year (WTO, 2004c, p. vii). The cotton zone is 
considered Mali’s breadbasket. “Overall, the cotton-producing area is among the richest 
areas in the country, with an estimated household income approximately five times the 
national average” (Bingen, 1998, p. 271). 
Mali began a series of adjustment programs in 1982, and signed an economic 
reform program with the World Bank and the IMF in 1988. Import quotas were 
eliminated in 1988 and export taxes dropped in 1991. Yet, a 1999 study on cotton 
production in Francophone West Africa stated that “Mali has resisted any serious efforts 
[to privatise]” (Levin, 1999). The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) issued a September 2001 document in which it noted that the cotton industry 
was at the heart of Mali’s growth strategy. “In spite of the efforts made by the authorities 
to liberalize the economy, Mali’s cotton industry has lagged behind what has been 
achieved in the neighbouring countries” (UNECA, 2001a, p. 3).  The document stated 
that the government had reaffirmed its decision to pursue private-sector liberalisation 
policies “in the medium-term.” 
In January 2002, the IMF lauded Mali for “a strong commitment to economic 
reform by the authorities,” while stressing the need for the country to diversity its 
economic base. The IMF directors said reforms in the cotton sector would be critical to 
Mali’s medium-term economic prospects, given the sector’s crucial role in the economy. 
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“They therefore regretted the delay in undertaking key reforms in this sector, and urged 
the authorities to complete these reforms as quickly as possible” (IMF, 2002b). The 
directors said they were encouraged by the government’s efforts to build consensus on 
the need to liberalise the cotton sector. Additionally, the document said “some directors 
noted that price supports and cotton subsidies in developed countries have tended to 
amplify the decline in cotton prices.”  
A memo from Mali’s Minister of Economy and Finance to the IMF acknowledged 
that Mali had failed to meet criteria for the reform of the cotton sector because of delays 
in the availability of financing and complex technical procedures required to initiate 
planned studies. But the report affirmed the government’s intent to proceed with the 
“essential” reforms, and outlined its commitment to liberalisation of the cotton sector, 
including steps to: control and lower production costs; establish a pricing mechanism 
based on free bargaining among economic agents in the sector; strengthen producers’ 
organizations; strengthen the role of the private sector; and contribute to poverty 
reduction by increasing incomes. “The ultimate goal is to liberalize the cotton sector by 
opening it up to competition and privatizing the CMDT” (IMF, 2002a). 
As in Burkina Faso, the cotton sector in Mali is under the control of a state-owned 
company that controls the provision of inputs and other services to farmers, and is the 
sole buyer of the entire cotton crop. The Compagnie Malienne de Développement des 
Textiles (CMDT) was created in 1974, with 60 percent Malian government capital and 40 
percent CFDT capital (Bingen, 1998, p. 269). The Malian government still owns 60 
percent of the CMDT, which has a legal monopoly on cotton ginning and marketing of 
cotton fibre in the cotton-growing area attributed to it, where virtually all of Mali’s cotton 
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is grown (WTO, 2004c, p. xi). The state determines the producer price for seed cotton, 
while the CMDT controls purchase of inputs, provides producers loans, purchases seed 
cotton, transports it to ginning plants, processes it and markets the cotton fibre on global 
markets (WTO, 2004c, p. 54).  
After a 1974 village protest against dishonest practices, the CMDT created village 
associations (AV) and gave them responsibility for grading and weighing, equipment and 
supply orders and credit management. In collaboration with the government, the CMDT 
secured World Bank financing to support the development of management skills within 
the AVs (Bingen, 1998, p. 267). Many of the AV leaders were chosen as pilot farmers to 
promote the use of new and improved production and marketing practices. Over the 
years, these leaders developed a sense of federation among themselves and partnership 
with the CMDT, Bingen argued, that contributed to their confidence in influencing 
CMDT policy (Bingen, 1998, p. 267). 
Their growing activism paralleled political changes in the country. Of the three 
countries, Mali’s government underwent the most dramatic changes in the last decade. 
President Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected in 1992 after 23 years of a military 
dictatorship. Following the 1991 overthrow of his predecessor, “several thousand cotton 
farmers … rose up to demand significant policy changes in cotton production and 
marketing” (Bingen, 1998, p. 265). Bingen said the rural revolt brought forth a vital new 
political actor in Malian politics, the National Union of Cotton and Food Crop Producers, 
Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton de Vivriers (SYCOV). “After listening to more than 
thirty years of governmental populist pronouncements, Mali’s cotton growers finally had 
a real opportunity to realize a measure of empowerment” (Bingen, 1998, p. 265).  
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In May 1991, cotton producers declared a strike focused on long-standing pricing 
and marketing issues. “There is little doubt that the new government’s commitment to 
democratization following the March 1991 coup d’état afforded cotton producers, 
ultimately through SYCOV, a previously unheard of measure of constitutional protection 
and political legitimacy” (Bingen, 1998, p. 268). After the revolt, Bingen said, CMDT 
and CFDT attempted to “co-opt” the discontented cotton farmers. With support from the 
World Bank, they organized a training and information program on the international 
cotton market for farmers, and conducted a survey of the producers’ marketing problems 
and concerns. They financed a study trip of the cotton marketing chain from Bamako to 
France. “In the long term, the strategy was designed to enhance CMDT/CFDT’s overall 
operations by creating a cadre of more technically and financially informed, and more 
‘professionalised’ cotton farmers who would appreciate the need to temper and adjust 
their demands to the ‘big picture’ of the international cotton market” (Bingen, 1998, p. 
277). 
Konaré won praise for his efforts to revive Mali’s faltering economy and his 
adherence to IMF guidelines, which were credited with increasing foreign investment and 
helping make Mali one of the largest cotton producers in Africa. Yet, in 2001, Mali 
experienced a sharp decline in cotton exports, attributed to political unrest in 
neighbouring countries and “unfavorable developments in the cotton sector” (IMF, 
2002a). Cotton producers boycotted in protest of the low price paid by the CMDT 
(ROPPA, 2004, p. 4). The boycott halved the volume of cotton production, and the crisis 
was compounded by the depressed world price for fibre (IMF, 2002b). Mali’s GDP 
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dropped by 3 percent and, the government, fearing instability, raised the price back to the 
previous year’s level (Thurow and Kilman, 2002). 
This was the year the World Bank began strongly advising privatisation. A Bank 
report blamed bad CMDT management for high costs and lack of transparency in sales of 
cotton fibre, and noted that the former chairman was to be tried for fraud and 
misappropriation (WTO, 2004c, p. 55). Mali adopted a Policy on Development of the 
Cotton Sector, with the goal of privatising the CMDT in 2006.  
A consultant to Malian producer associations said producers initially opposed the 
recommendation, but Bank findings of poor management and corruption convinced them 
to support privatisation. A number of things have happened since, however, to lessen 
producer support. Prior to 2002, CMDT alone set the cotton price, but producers now are 
involved in negotiating what they will receive. Prices are set prior to the May/June 
planting, to be paid after the October/November harvest.  In early 2004, CMDT and 
producers agreed to a price of 210 CFA/kilogram of seed cotton. The world price 
dropped in June, and the CMDT realized it would not be able to pay the farmers the 
agreed price. It approached the World Bank for $40 billion CFA to honor the payments. 
The Bank refused, saying the CMDT needed to renegotiate. This response, the consultant 
said, soured the producers on the Bank. “When the CMDT set the price alone, the World 
Bank told producers ‘It is too low. You must fight.” Now the World Bank is telling 
CMDT to go back to the producers and lower the price” (Dembélé, 2004). Additionally, 
he said, Mali had negative experiences privatising the railroad and energy companies, 
after which prices for services increased. “Privatisation is not an easy thing, but the 
World Bank is always pushing it” (Dembélé, 2004). 
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In 2002, Amadou Toumani Touré was elected president. Like Burkina Faso’s 
Compaoré, he has been a vocal critic of the U.S. cotton subsidies, and he testified about 
their impact in the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa in June 2003. 
Touré has reportedly asked the World Bank to allow delay of CMDT privatization until 
2008 (Dembélé, 2004). He is up for re-election in 2007 and if re-elected, could use his 
mandate to push through the privatisation. Dembélé said the Bank has agreed, but 
conditions are still being determined. 
Despite the shortcomings of the CMDT, changing the system is not a 
straightforward task. In June 2004, a case study on the Malian cotton sector discussed the 
changes that had taken place, with reassigning roles in the public and private sectors, and 
remodelling the producer support system. The report said the old system gave producers 
access to agricultural innovation, through tightly-linked advisory and support services, 
because the CMDT controlled the “upstream” side, i.e. providing inputs and access to 
credit, as well as the “downstream” side, being responsible for processing and marketing 
the cotton (Zoundi, 2004, p. 4). The report stated that the CMDT offered a “holistic 
system” that included other activities contributing to food security, such as promoting 
activities that generated income for women.  
The restructuring of the system was intended to reduce production costs (to keep 
in line with falling world prices), improve yields (by building up capacity of extension 
agents), create cotton producer associations more focused than village groups, strengthen 
the participation of the private sector, contribute to poverty alleviation by improving 
quality of life, and determine cotton prices through open negotiations among stakeholders 
(Zoundi, 2004, p. 5).  These goals are to be achieved by CMDT withdrawing from many 
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of its current activities. Yet, the author questioned whether the cotton producer 
associations would be able to handle all the new functions they would be expected to 
provide, and the commitment and willingness of the private sector to invest heavily in 
agricultural advisory services  (Zoundi, 2004, p. 6).  
A senior CMDT official said the strategy was being defined “by the outside,” and 
spoke of the need to privatise in a “logical fashion,” saying if it was not done correctly, it 
could throw the system off balance (CMDT, 2004). Cotton producers have seen the 
effects of privatisation in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, he said, where their peers work and do 
not get paid, and they are worried. “Why privatise when the system is functioning well?” 
(CMDT, 2004). “The CFDT, in order to protect its business position, vehemently opposes 
a concerted World Bank led effort to ‘liberalise’ cotton production and marketing that 
would oblige Mali and other governments to dismantle their exclusive relationship with 
the CFDT group and follow the examples of Cameroon or Benin” (Bingen, 1998, p. 274). 
In the 2003-2004 season, a new formula for fixing producer prices was 
implemented to take into account the global price for cotton, which would raise the price 
paid to producers (WTO, 2004c, pp. 50, 55). “If external scrutiny of the performance of 
the Malian cotton sector remains high and producer pressure is sustained with the sector, 
domestic seed cotton prices could track world prices more closely in future than in the 
past” (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 39).  
Both this opportunity and the approach of the CMDT spurred producers to 
confront the U.S. cotton subsidies. The CMDT responded to World Bank criticism of 
underpaying Malian cotton farmers by saying American subsidies limited earnings 
(Dembélé, 2004). It is estimated that if U.S. subsidies were removed, the typical Malian 
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farm would increase earnings by 30 percent (Tefft, 2004). “After that, the producers 
began to learn more. ROPPA [network of West African cotton producers] informed them 
that if they were poor it was because the world market price is low. They were told ‘We 
have to get together and fight against these subsidies.’” (Dembélé, 2004). In 2003, 
Malian producers wrote a letter to their government asking them to negotiate with the 
U.S. government to abandon subsidies, and producers in Benin and Burkina Faso did the 
same, Dembélé said. “The first step was made by the producers, with the influence of 
ROPPA.” 
The Malian producers pushed in the last decade for changes in the structure of the 
cotton sector in order to improve their earnings. Recently, they have applied similar 
vigour to the issue of U.S. subsidies, with the same goal in mind. The next section looks 
at the prognosis for the West African cotton market, to give perspective to their efforts. 
 
4.5 Prognosis  
 
The preceding sections outlined the efforts of the three countries and cotton 
producers to reform their cotton sectors to meet the requirements of international donors. 
This section considers the prognosis for their industry. The ICAC forecasts that world 
cotton prices will remain between 50-60 cents per pound until 2015 (Watkins, 2003). The 
U.S. has a $60 million cotton promotion program aimed to generate worldwide demand, 
and the ICAC has established an international cotton promotion program (Baffes, 2004a, 
p. 31).  Global consumption of cotton is trending upwards. By 2010, the ICAC estimates 
world cotton consumption will be 23.6 million tons (Baffes, 2004a, p. 4). The World 
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Bank predicts world cotton consumption may grow by as much as 1.3 percent in the next 
decade, with world demand increasing within five years by about 500,000 tons, more 
than half the entire production of West and Central Africa. “These changes offer real 
opportunities that, if adequately exploited, should allow the region to significantly 
expand output and more than double its market share over the course of the decade” 
(World Bank, 2000, p. 5).           
 
Photo 2: Cotton farmers near Bla, Mali, November 2004   Photo by E. Lynn Heinisch 
 
A World Bank 2002 paper said the long-term strategic objective in the West and 
Central Africa cotton sector is to increase and sustain its contribution to poverty 
reduction through employment creation and income generation in the rural areas, and to 
contribute to export earnings and government revenue (Badiane et al, 2002). The Bank 
report said industry growth has “shown considerable multiplier effects on employment 
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and income in the rest of the rural economy due to the expansions in income from cash 
crops.” It outlined a series of next steps that countries should take to further reform the 
sector, noting that prospects for poverty reduction would be improved with enhanced 
competition and allowing a larger share of the world price to be passed through to 
farmers. However, the report included a warning that the cotton sector was undergoing 
“difficult times due to historically low world price, partly reflecting generous subsidies to 
cotton growers in the United States, China and the European Union, and the slow 
transition to competition among private ginning and marketing companies.” The report 
said cotton is key to rural poverty reduction in the region, given its importance for 
exports. “The WCA countries would benefit greatly from removal of price supports and 
subsidies to cotton growers in the other parts of the world” (Badiane et al, 2002, pp. 20-
21) 
Levin concluded in 1999 that the impact of privatisation of cotton companies in 
Francophone West Africa had been limited and was “unlikely in the near term to have a 
negative consequence on the industry because it is not fundamentally changing the 
historical industry structure.” He cited a World Bank report that stated ‘the basic 
monopsonistic/monopolistic structure have been maintained’ (Levin, 1999, p. 8).  
Nonetheless, to varying degrees, the governments of Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Mali have taken steps to liberalise their cotton sectors and have committed to continue in 
this direction. In theory, this should benefit their farmers. In a free-market system, the 
state does not pay the farmers an artificially low price and reap the profits of selling their 
product on the world market. The state is removed from the equation and farmers are paid 
the market price. However, as West African states withdraw from managing the cotton 
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sector, if the world price is depressed by U.S. cotton subsidies, farmers will inherit the 
brunt of the impact.  
Additionally, all three countries will suffer reduced export revenues. As noted 
earlier, U.S. cotton subsidies for 2001-2002 cost Burkina Faso 12 percent of export 
earnings (1 percent of GDP), Mali 8 percent of export earnings (1.7 percent of GDP) and 
Benin 9 percent of export earnings (1.4 percent of GDP) (Watkins, 2002, p. 3). 
This chapter has looked at the domestic factors influencing the health and 
evolution of the West African cotton industry. It has underscored the critical role played 
by producers. The next chapter will look at the “external” efforts of the producers and 
their governments, exploring the strategy and tactics by which the West Africans are 
attempting to influence U.S. policy. 
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Chapter 5. Pushing Back – West African efforts to end U.S. subsidies 
 
The previous chapters described the domestic factors underlying the U.S. 
subsidies and the development of the cotton sectors in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. 
These foundations set the stage for the confrontation between the West Africans 
governments and the Americans. Understanding how each of the parties arrived at this 
point helps to explain their actions. This chapter focuses on how and why the West 
Africans are lobbying against the U.S. subsidies. 
 There is nothing surprising about what the U.S. has done. The country is 
powerful enough to implement a farm policy that seems contrary to the spirit of 
international agreements it has signed.  Clearly, it is in the politicians’ interest to 
subsidise cotton farmers, who are part of an influential farm lobby. What is new, 
however, is what the West Africans are doing. The all-time low price for cotton in 
October 2001 generated “unprecedented political mobilization among producers” (Baden, 
2004, p. 1). Rather than lamenting the inequities of a system keeping them impoverished, 
they have mounted a challenge. They are using the institutions and rules established by 
the most powerful in an attempt to alter their role in the game. They have lined up 
influential allies to assist them, and are using politically savvy tools and techniques, such 
as mass media and lobbying. 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali are attempting to influence U.S. policy, reduce 
American cotton subsidies and be compensated for their losses. This approach has risks, 
as the countries are dependent on the U.S. for aid and favourable trade conditions. Yet, 
their tactics have yielded early results.  
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Trade is becoming increasingly important in generating income for developing 
countries, and they are building their capacity to participate effectively in trade debates 
and negotiations.  In 1999 developing countries generated 30 times more revenue through 
exports than they received in development aid (McClymont, 2004, p. 2). The World Bank 
estimates that removing developed country tariffs and agriculture subsidies would raise 
global income by $500 billion by 2015, of which more than 60 percent would flow to 
poorer countries and enable an estimated 14 million people to extricate themselves from 
poverty (McClymont, 2004, p. 2). 
In the last decade, and particularly in the last five years, international bodies have 
underscored the importance of structuring trade to be equitable and to benefit the poorest.  
During the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(forerunner to the WTO), trade ministers adopted the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), 
which focused on distortions of agricultural trade. This agreement, signed by the U.S., 
aimed to bolster free trade by requiring members to reduce domestic support for 
agriculture. The AOA has been central to challenges of the U.S. cotton subsidies. 
The WTO Doha Ministerial Round (begun in November 2001) called for 
“enhanced market access and balanced rules” to ensure that developing countries share in 
the benefits of world trade. Among other things, trade ministers called for substantial 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. “Yet these important promises and 
commitments have not been recognized in practice. The evolution of trade and the thrust 
of trade negotiations have not sufficiently reflected these multilateral commitments, 
producing disillusionment among developing countries as evidenced in the failure of 
Cancun [ministerial meeting], making clear stark differences on trade between developed 
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and developing nations. … The U.S. and other wealthy countries with most influence on 
trade rules have some distance to go to meaningfully incorporate this pro-development 
trade agenda” (McClymont, 2004, p. 3). 
A 2003 report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) noted that Africa’s share of world exports fell from about 6 percent in 1980 
to 2 percent in 2002. “This phenomenon has as much to do with the structure of 
international trade as with … the trade policies applied in the continent in the past 20 
years” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 3).  “Even though improvements in domestic policies, 
institutions and governance hold the key to sustained growth, progress on many of these 
fronts depends primarily on action by the international community” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 
7). The UNCTAD report noted that Africa’s dependence on primary commodities for 
export earnings makes it vulnerable to the vagaries of the market and weather conditions. 
Notably, UNCTAD says, “the loss of market shares for cotton and sugar is largely due to 
high subsidies and domestic support for less competitive producers in the United States 
and Europe” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 7). 
This disconnect between words and action – what is pledged and promoted versus 
what states actually do – has been around a long time. “With the political leadership of 
the majority world clearly divided or too weak to stand up, the European Union, United 
States, and the Cairns group of countries continue to play the macabre dance of free 
markets exacerbating marginalization of the farming communities in the south. 
Regardless of the impact on south, the big boys go on merrily strengthening the 
inequalities. They come out with their own rules of the games, and the developing 
countries are expected to appreciate and clap” (Sharma, 2003, p. 3). “Many … 
 71
developing countries have time and again stood up to the hegemony of the so-called free 
trade regime. But tactical arm-twisting by the U.S., E.U., Australia and Japan has always 
thwarted the rise of the collective power” (Sharma, 2003, p. 2). 
Yet, in the face of this, the West Africans have pushed back, undoubtedly driven 
by the crisis they are confronting. “The West Africa governments … supported by active 
producer associations have been in the forefront of efforts to persuade the industrialized 
countries, above all the United States, to reduce cotton subsidies and to provide interim 
compensation for the damage that their economies are enduring” (Baden, 2004, p. 1). 
They have done so using the mechanisms of the WTO, lobbying U.S. politicians directly 
and through the media, and working as a coalition. The following sections explore each 
of these tactics in detail. 
 
5.1 Using the World Trade Organization 
 
As discussed earlier, the WTO is considered the vehicle by which countries can 
redress grievances with the trade practices of other members. The West Africans have 
used WTO procedures and systems to challenge the American subsidies.  
The three countries are members of the WTO African group, which put forth a 
proposal on the negotiations of agriculture in March 2001 (WTO, 2001a). The proposal 
was an effort to negotiate for new, favourable terms in the WTO agriculture agreement 
and called for a reduction of domestic support measures in developed countries.  The 
proposal said that “the importance of agriculture in the economies of African countries 
cannot be overstated.” It discussed the efforts of African countries to liberalise their 
agriculture sectors, noted that “severe fiscal constraints” limit their possibility for using 
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subsidies in any comparable manner to developed countries and said agricultural policy 
reform in Africa had been penalized under multilateral rules. One writer called the 
group’s proposals among the most comprehensive and detailed of any country or trading 
bloc (Fleshman, 2003). Mali and Burkina Faso filed similar proposals (WTO, 2001b and 
2001c), noting their dependence on cotton. 
Benin signed on as a third party to a challenge Brazil filed with the WTO against 
the United States in October 2002. The Brazilians argued that U.S. subsidies to cotton 
farmers in 2002 were double the amount paid in 1992, which violated WTO agreements 
(specifically the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures). Brazil alleged that that the subsidies caused “significant price 
depression and price suppression” in the cotton market, and artificially increased the 
world market share for U.S. cotton. Brazil’s complaint stated that the U.S. actions, which 
“displace and impede” Brazil’s export market share in the world cotton market, were in 
violation of WTO agreements that the U.S. had signed. “Without the benefit of US 
domestic and export subsidies, many US producers would not be able to produce upland 
cotton without sustaining a significant loss; current price projections for marketing years 
2003-2007 indicate that US upland cotton prices are expected to remain well below the 
US cost of production” (WTO, 2002). Brazil estimated it had lost more than $600 million 
due to prices depressed by U.S. subsidies in 2001. 
In June 2004, it was reported that the WTO panel had determined U.S. subsidies 
did depress world prices and violated WTO rules. The WTO reportedly gave the U.S. 
until 1 July 2005 to remove the subsidies. Media coverage stated that the decision would 
force the U.S. to lower cotton subsidies and could prompt challenges from other 
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developing countries. The U.S. appealed the WTO decision, but “few appeals succeed 
completely” (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 21).  Oxfam said the ruling vindicated the demands 
of the West African countries to reduce U.S. subsidies and said the WTO rules-based 
system would be weakened if the U.S. failed to do so (Oxfam, 2004b). 
While the Brazil challenge was under consideration, the West Africans took other 
steps. In June 2002, agricultural ministers for West and Central Africa commissioned a 
study to measure the financial losses incurred by their cotton sectors due to subsidies in 
the U.S., China and the European Union, and to propose a mechanism for compensation 
(Goreux, 2004, p. 14). The results were used in a cotton initiative submitted to the WTO 
the following year. 
In April 2003, the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali wrote to 
WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi, introducing the “Poverty Reduction: 
Sectoral Initiative in Favor of Cotton” (WTO, 2003a). Burkina Faso President Compaoré 
presented the initiative 10 June 2003 to the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee. This 
was the first time in the history of the WTO that a president came to make his case 
(Imboden, 2004). The widely publicised initiative, supported by 13 other African 
countries, called for two decisions to be taken at the Cancun ministerial meeting in 
September of that year. The West Africans requested the phase-out of support measures 
for production and export of cotton and, until cotton production support measures were 
eliminated, financial compensation for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). They 
proposed that the richest WTO members compensate West African cotton producers for 
losses until the subsidies were phased out. Their losses were estimated at $250 million a 
year; combining the “direct and indirect” effects of subsidies would be about $1 billion a 
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year, they said. In a follow-up document, they proposed that compensation be paid for 
three years of production (2000 to 2002), and that subsidising countries continue to pay 
“beneficiary LDCs” amounts that would decrease “in proportion to their effective efforts 
to reduce their cotton subsidies” (WTO, 2003c, pp. 3-4). 
The proposal outlined the importance of cotton for the four countries and 10 
million people in the region depending directly on cotton production. It noted that cotton 
producers in the West and Central African (WCA) countries had made strenuous efforts 
to ensure that their production was competitive and to liberalise the sector. As a result, 
they were among the most competitive producers, and their cost of producing cotton was 
substantially lower than that of other producing countries. The document stated the 
countries had made the necessary, “sometimes painful,” adjustments to adapt their 
economies to global markets and WTO objectives. “Until now, the impact of such 
reforms on development in the WCA countries has been virtually nullified by the fact that 
certain member countries of the WTO continue to apply support measures that distort 
global market prices, contrary to the basic objectives of the WTO” (WTO, 2003a). 
The document argued that addressing the inequities caused by the U.S. subsidies 
would “enable the multilateral system to show that the objectives fixed apply to all 
Member countries and take into account the vital interests of the most vulnerable among 
them.” In a follow-up document, submitted by the four countries in August 2003, they 
described the “emergency situation” facing their countries and requested that the WTO 
members take up the issue at the ministerial conference in Cancun. They said 
compensation would serve as a stop-gap measure until benefits could be realised from the 
restoration of the free market. The states said the money would go to local cotton 
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producers’ associations and for improving physical and social infrastructures in cotton 
growing areas (WTO, 2003c). 
The West African representatives argued at Cancun that U.S. cotton subsidies 
needed to be reformed as part of the Doha development agenda negotiations. In response, 
the U.S. suggested that the West African countries should diversify production away 
from cotton (Baden, 2004, p.1), and said African farmers needed a comprehensive 
initiative that expanded the world market from fibre to garment. “Create a bigger demand 
for t-shirts,” sneered one participant (Cobb, 2003d). An advisor to the West Africans said 
they were “visibly, physically angry” with the U.S. response. He said the U.S. 
representatives “completely misread” the situation. “They didn’t think cotton was going 
to be such an issue [at the meeting]. They were not ready” (Imboden, 2004). 
The U.S. and E.U. each put forth proposals for reducing agriculture support. 
However, they were unable to reach common ground, and developing countries refused 
to allow negotiations to move forward until agricultural dumping and domestic support 
were addressed.  The WTO meeting ended in a stalemate. “The failure to reach 
agreement on cotton was a key reason for this impasse” (OECD, 2004). The next 
ministerial conference is scheduled for December 2005 in Hong Kong. 
The “poverty reduction” initiative put forth by the West Africans, however, led to 
other events. According to Baffes, it was determined that the “trade part of the request 
(i.e. subsidies)” fell within the WTO’s mandate, but that the “development part of the 
request (i.e. compensation)” should be handled by multilateral institutions and the 
concerned governments (Baffes, 2004b, Box 2). Therefore, in March 2004, the WTO 
held a regional workshop on cotton in Cotonou, Benin, with participants from 30 African 
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countries, 18 multilateral institutions and representatives from several countries, 
including the U.S. ambassador to the WTO. The WTO said the purpose of the workshop 
was to address the problems caused by support granted to cotton producers in “certain 
countries” and to discuss possibilities for financial and technical assistance to affected 
countries. The U.S. said the workshop “was an outgrowth of the consensus among WTO 
members … that cotton should be addressed from both the trade-related and 
development-related perspectives” (U.S. Government, 2004). The outcome, Baffes said, 
was that donors “reaffirmed their willingness to deal with the development part of the 
cotton initiative within the existing channels” (Baffes, 2004b, Box 2). 
In May 2004, trade ministers for the Least Developed Countries issued a 
statement calling for WTO members to adopt the proposals submitted by proponents of 
the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton (Dakar Declaration, 2004). On 28 July 2004, Benin’s 
WTO representative, Ambassador Samuel Amehou, said at a Geneva press conference 
that the West Africans had agreed to include cotton in agriculture negotiations, rather 
than as a separate issue, in order to move discussions forward. The trade minister of 
Benin, Fatiou Akplogan, said this was in response to concerns raised by developed 
country cotton subsidisers that they faced internal constraints that prevented them from 
dealing with the cotton issue outside the agriculture negotiations (Hormeku, 2004). 
After a 31 July meeting, the WTO director general announced that members had 
agreed to substantial reductions (20 percent) in domestic support for agriculture. Though 
there was no timetable for this to be done, he said the general council recognized the 
importance of cotton for developing countries, and pledged the issue would be addressed 
“ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations.” The 
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agreement mentioned cotton 11 times, “which is extraordinary” (Hancock, 2004), and 
called for a new subcommittee on cotton that would meet periodically to ensure 
appropriate prioritisation of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral initiatives 
(Laws, 2004). 
The director general characterized the deal as a “significant breakthrough in 
cotton trade which offers great opportunity for cotton farmers in West Africa and 
throughout the developing world” (WTO, 2004d). Brazil’s foreign minister called it “the 
beginning of the end of all subsidies” (Chapman, 2004) and the World Bank issued a 
statement “welcoming” the agreement. Yet, others were less sanguine, noting the 
influence of agricultural lobbies and that it would be several years before binding deals 
were reached. Burkina Faso President Compaoré said the agreement lacked substance. 
“In this increasingly globalized existence there needs to be clear rules and regulations – 
or else the little countries will forever be held back. Our northern partners speak often of 
development, but development cannot happen without trade, which they are preventing 
us from doing” (Agence France-Presse, 2004). 
The actions of the West African governments support those who hold that the 
WTO provides the mechanism to create a level playing field for international trade. 
Developing countries increasingly file challenges through the dispute settlement process. 
Analysts interpret this as a sign that the developing countries feel the system works, and 
that the dispute settlement understanding process is a legitimate vehicle by which to 
redress their grievances. “Developing countries started realizing that their full 
participation in multilateral trade negotiations, and dispute settlement and safeguards 
issues in particular, was the only way to check the growth of aggressive unilateralism on 
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the part of developed countries” (Romano, 2002, p. 598). Developing countries were 
instrumental in developing the dispute settlement understanding process during the 
Uruguay Round and “expected that the new dispute settlement process would help the 
weaker trading partners in enforcing the rights and obligations under the various WTO 
agreements” (Nair, 2001, p. 5). This point was underscored by Malian President Touré in 
testimony to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Africa, when he said “the recourse to the 
WTO itself is an expression of our countries’ trust and confidence in the system of world 
trade regulation and arbitration, in the inception of which the United States played a 
major role” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2003, p. 10). 
There are practical limitations to how effectively weaker countries can make use 
of the process. Developing countries face a number of hurdles in filing WTO challenges, 
not least of which is the risk of antagonising a state upon which they are beholden for aid, 
debt forgiveness and trade. The fact that Brazil and the West African states have 
confronted the U.S. on cotton subsidies is an indication of how critical their situation is.  
Beyond the political risks, developing countries often lack the human, legal and 
financial resources to wage a successful challenge at the WTO. The 2004 WTO trade 
policy reviews of Burkina Faso and Mali noted that neither country has sufficient human 
or financial resources to participate fully in WTO activities. Yet the West African 
governments have received top-calibre assistance, from groups such as the IDEAS Centre 
in Geneva, which helps developing countries defend their interests in the WTO.  A later 
section will look at the role these allies have played. 
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5.2 Speaking out: A common message, many voices 
 
In addition to formal challenges through the WTO system, the West African 
representatives have used public venues to argue for the removal of subsidies. In Abidjan 
in June 2002, agriculture ministers from West and Central Africa recommended 
establishing a regional coalition to defend the interests of the region within multilateral 
institutions such as the WTO. “Advocacy and lobbying activities should be carried out at 
the international level on the impact of agricultural subsidy policies on West and Central 
African countries and their populations,” the ministers said (Mutume, 2003). A 2003 
study on cotton sector reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa stated that industrialized country 
subsidies had devastating effects on poverty in Africa. African countries should therefore 
“publicize their case to convince public opinion in industrialised countries of the 
pernicious effects of the subsidies granted by their governments to cotton producers” 
(Goreux and Macrae, 2003, p. 7). 
They have done so in a united front, with representatives from all three 
governments, and the cotton associations. Malian President Touré testified before the 
U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittee on Africa in June 
2003, the first African head of state to testify before the committee (Cobb, 2003b). Touré 
said he was representing all African nations in saying that U.S. and European subsidies 
and tariffs “support injustice” and contribute to the economic deterioration of African 
cotton-producing countries. He said cotton had become a burden, rather than an asset, as 
Mali was forced to subsidise the sector to make up for losses due to low world prices.  
“We have decided to pull the alarm bell,” said Touré, who testified that international 
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trade rules are biased by the subsidies of developed countries. “We want these countries 
to accept competition on the basis of rules that they themselves enacted.” A news article 
quoted a member of the president’s party as saying “We needed to bring some weight to 
this” (Cobb, 2003b). 
On 11 July 2003, President Touré and Burkina Faso President Compaoré 
published an opinion piece in the New York Times titled “Your Farm Subsidies Are 
Strangling Us.” As the presidents of two of Africa’s least developed countries, they said, 
they were eager to participate in the multilateral trading system and take on its rights and 
obligations. “Cotton is our ticket into the world market. Its production is crucial to 
economic development in West and Central Africa, as well as to the livelihoods of 
millions of people there.  … More than that, cotton is of paramount importance to the 
social infrastructure of Africa.” The presidents described the threat of U.S. subsidies to 
“the sole agricultural product for our countries to trade.” They asked that free trade rules 
be applied not only to products “of interest to the rich and powerful” but to those 
products where poor countries have a proven comparative advantage (Touré and 
Compaoré, 2003).  Their act was described as a “stunning role reversal” in the Agence 
France-Presse (Kniazkov, 2003). 
The minister of commerce for Benin, Fatiou Akplogan, underscored the plight of 
the West African cotton farmers at a news conference in Cancun. “Millions of peasants 
have failed, and without a solution today we will fall further into misery” (Becker, 
2003b). Mali Finance Minister Bassary Touré said “The money that those countries put 
into agricultural subsidies is five times what they give as development assistance. And 
we’ve always said to those rich countries, ‘you’re hypocrites.’ You always tell us to play 
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the rules of the open market at the same time as you subsidise your farmers. How can 
they twist the arms of our impoverished farmers, when they’re using extraordinary 
amounts of money to subsidise farmers in America and Europe?” (Baxter, 2003). Burkina 
Faso’s Agriculture Minister Salif Diallo said “What is disgusting to us is that the rules 
prohibiting subsidies were supported and organized within the WTO by the same powers 
that are today giving subsidies to their farmers. There’s something wrong somewhere” 
(Mutume, 2003). 
Cotton producer federations of the three countries issued a joint statement saying 
“Frankly, we are starting to doubt whether rich countries really want to reduce poverty in 
developing countries “ (Mutume, 2003). The National Union of Cotton Farmers of 
Burkina Faso said  “In the countries where they subsidize, only about a 5 percent of the 
population are farmers. Here, farmers represent some 80 percent of a population that is 
becoming increasingly impoverished on land that is itself becoming poorer, without the 
least help from the state” (Mutume, 2003). 
It appears that advocacy efforts will continue. “Farmers must maintain and extend 
their participation in subregional and international negotiations. … The lobbying work 
done by West African national cotton-growers’ federations has contributed directly and 
indirectly to the interest shown in this sector by the World Bank and IMF. … While not 
overstating the value of the cotton-growers’ strategies and initiatives, it will be difficult to 
continue to ignore them” (Hazard, 2002, p. 4).  
In filing their complaint and in their public statements, the West African countries 
operated as a group. This tactic is consistent with the way developing countries have 
handled WTO disputes – filing jointly gives them more clout than if acting alone.  
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“Although a certain amount of heterogeneity still exists, developing countries have begun 
to speak with a more consistent voice than ever in the past. … It is very significant that 
133 developing countries … overcame their differences and released a lengthy set of joint 
demands just prior to the Doha ministerial, calling for, among other things, fundamental 
reforms to agricultural subsidy programmes in developed countries” (Beierle, 2002, p. 
1102). 
This approach is deemed as effective. Developing countries should cooperate with 
partners with like interests to gain bargaining power to force significant changes in world 
trade (Bjornskov and Lind, 2002, p. 562; Lake, 1987). Lake said that “barring altruistic 
motivations” by developed countries, concessions toward more equitable trading 
practices will only be obtained by collective Third World pressure on the North (Lake, 
1987, p. 221). “There is much that is in the mutual interest of all developing countries. … 
The developing countries need to either sink or swim together” (Pant, 2002, p. 226). In 
June 2003, trade and agriculture ministers from 12 cotton-producing countries met in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Burkina Trade Minister Benoit Ouattara said afterward 
“The meeting has given us hope by providing us with the opportunity to confirm the 
unity that is needed for the survival of thousands of producers and millions of others who 
depend directly on cotton” (IRIN, 2003c). 
Despite variations in how they have restructured and liberalised their cotton 
industries, the three countries are acting as a unit in the negotiations. They are speaking 
with one voice. Though their interests may diverge when it comes to competing for 
market share, they have a common goal while trying to save their industries. This unified 
approach has presumably made it easier for their allies. 
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5.3 Powerful allies  
 
A number of influential parties, including United Nations representatives, 
international financial institutions and nongovernmental agencies, have rallied behind the 
West African governments and cotton farmers. The issue of subsidies is one of the few 
that aligns conservatives, advocating removal of government intervention, and liberals, 
concerned about poverty and development. This chapter looks at the role of those allies. 
“Cotton is a poster child for what’s wrong with U.S. farm policy” said a trade 
analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute (Hancock, 2004). One observer described this 
alliance between “idealists of the left, third world producers and traditional conservative 
promoters of free trade” as unprecedented (Lind, 2003). Oxfam, which has been at the 
forefront of the campaign against U.S. subsidies, said the challenge is “to build a 
coalition of developing countries, civil-society organizations, and enlightened 
industrialized countries to put effective pressure on the USA and EU to change their 
policies” (Baden, 2004, p. 3). 
This is happening. Not only are the West Africans criticising the subsidies. “Just 
about any multilateral economic or development agency you can think of has issued 
reports railing against rich nations’ farm subsidies” (New York Times, 2003b). 
In 2002, the World Bank issued a report on “Globalization, Growth and Poverty” calling 
for a “development round” of trade negotiations. “Rich countries maintain protections in 
exactly the areas where developing countries have comparative advantage, and there 
would be large gains to poor countries if these were reduced” (World Bank, 2002c, p. 
18). 
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The Bank’s Chief Economist Nicholas Stern said “it is hypocritical to preach the 
advantages of trade and markets and then erect obstacles in precisely those markets in 
which developing countries have a comparative advantage” (World Bank, 2002b). Stern 
wrote an editorial in the International Herald Tribune calling for countries to remove 
trade barriers, saying that the rich countries’ “do as we say not as we do approach” makes 
reform in developing countries difficult politically. He said the U.S. Farm Bill cast doubts 
“on the willingness of rich countries to follow through on their pledges to put 
development at the center of global trade talks” (Stern, 2002). Bank President James 
Wolfensohn said “market restrictions and subsidies in agriculture are the single most 
important external impediment to tackling poverty in developing countries” (Cobb, 
2003a). The Bank reiterated this point in its 2003 World Development Indicators report, 
described as having “chided” industrialized countries for sliding on their promises to 
lower trade barriers (Williams, 2003). The report said if rich countries lowered their trade 
barriers they could lift an additional 300 million people out of poverty by 2015 (World 
Bank, 2003). 
Leading up to the WTO’s ministerial conference at Cancun, the World Bank 
published a report on Global Economic Prospects saying annual cotton subsidies to U.S. 
farmers of more than $3 billion (three times U.S. foreign aid to Africa) “depress world 
cotton prices and crowd out poor but efficient farmers in West Africa” (Cobb, 2003c). 
The World Bank’s vice president for external affairs told the New York Times “reducing 
these subsidies and removing agricultural trade barriers is one of the most important 
things that rich countries can do for millions of people to escape poverty all over the 
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world. It’s not an exaggeration to say that rich countries’ agricultural policies lead to 
starvation” (Becker, 2003a).  
In its 2002 World Economic Outlook, the IMF discussed the gains to be made if 
industrialized countries liberalised their agricultural sectors, noting in particular that the 
2002 U.S. Farm Bill moved “in the opposite direction” (IMF, 2002c, p. 83). The report 
said the world would gain a boost of $128 billion if farm subsidies were scrapped 
(Agence France-Presse, 2002). The World Bank and IMF issued a report in September 
2002 on “Market Access for Developing Country Exports – Selected Issues” which said 
the U.S. Farm Bill represented a “step back” from reform (IMF and World Bank, 2002). 
UNCTAD issued a report in July 2003 on Africa’s economic development, with a 
focus on trade issues. The report cited World Bank and Oxfam findings on the negative 
impacts of U.S. cotton subsidies on West African cotton producers, noting that West 
African cotton-producing countries would have earned an additional $1 billion if prices 
from 1999-2002 had remained at 1998 levels, when they were historically average 
(UNCTAD, 2003, p. 13).  The UNCTAD secretariat encouraged elimination of subsidies 
in developed countries (singling out cotton, among others) and said there should be an 
international mechanism to ensure that countries providing subsidies compensate African 
countries for the resulting income losses (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 19).  
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said prior to the Cancun meeting, “We are told 
that free trade brings opportunity for all people, not just a fortunate few. We are told that 
it can provide a ladder to a better life, and deliverance from poverty and despair. Sadly, 
the reality of the international trading system today does not match the rhetoric” (Annan, 
2003). Annan’s 2002 report on the implementation of the U.N. Millenium Declaration 
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said “even the best efforts of developing countries to break out of the cycle of poverty … 
are likely to be insufficient unless they can count on the support of the international 
community” (Annan, 2002, p. 10). The report called for developed countries to “live up 
to the market principles about which they preach so eloquently to the poor” (Annan, 
2002, p. 11). At Cancun, the WTO director general broke from “conventional neutrality” 
to say there was merit to the West Africans’ complaints about U.S. subsidies and that he 
would intervene to address their grievances (Becker, 2003b). 
The Economist noted that the West Africans had been “prodded and encouraged 
by non-governmental organizations, especially Oxfam” in their efforts to include cotton 
on the Cancun agenda (Economist, 2003). Oxfam was the most vocal nongovernmental 
agency to flag the issue of subsidies. It produced several policy papers, including 
“Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of U.S. Cotton Subsidies on Africa,” “White Gold 
Turns to Dust: Which Way Forward for Cotton in West Africa?” and “Dumping: the 
Beginning of the End? Implications of the Ruling in the Brazil/US Cotton Dispute.”  
Oxfam, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) 
and the IDEAS Centre organized a WTO Public Symposium in June 2003 on the topic of 
“Can negotiations on agriculture deliver pro-development reforms? The case of West 
African cotton.” The agencies stated that the West Africans faced considerable political, 
technical and organizational challenges, given the complexity of developing a case at the 
WTO and the under-representation of West African countries in Geneva.  The aims of the 
session included raising awareness among WTO members of the problems facing West 
African cotton growers and rural people due to subsidies, and mobilising international 
expertise to advance West African countries’ sustainable development objectives 
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(ICTSD, OXFAM and IDEAS Centre, 2003, p. 2). The West African governments also 
received help from the International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty (ILEAP), 
which produced a policy brief titled “Legal Issues in Relation to Financial Compensation 
under the Cotton Initiative” in order to “assist African countries with respect to the 
Cotton Initiative in the WTO” (ILEAP, 2004). 
 “U.S. cotton farmers have watched with amazement as a British charity 
organization, OXFAM International, orchestrated a campaign that succeeded in painting 
them as being solely responsible for the impoverishment of millions of African farmers 
and other of the world’s woes. The campaign was aided by national media outlets like the 
New York Times and Wall Street Journal that have prattled on and on about government 
payments to big, corporate farmers while conveniently overlooking the tax breaks they 
receive” (Laws, 2004). 
Other affected industries have thrown their weight behind the campaign. The 
managing director of Fludor Benin, the company that processes cotton seeds into oil, 
spoke at the March 2004 WTO Africa regional workshop on cotton about how the 
subsidies were affecting his industry. “If the production of cotton collapses, it will lead to 
the end of the edible oil sector” (Riboux, 2004). His article in La Nation, the Beninois 
daily newspaper, highlighted the problem of U.S. cotton subsidies (Riboux, 2002). The 
cotton sector also found “an unlikely ally” in the director general of the International 
Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Committee who wrote a letter to the Financial Times in June 
2003 complaining that increased cotton subsidies were depressing demand for substitute 
products that had competitive advantages (Baffes, 2004a, p. viii). 
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Simultaneously, the case of the West African states – and other developing 
countries burdened by subsidies in the industrialized world – was backed by additional 
mechanisms. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) proposed 
negotiating international measures and agreements to facilitate access to the world market 
by African products. The NEPAD framework discussed the need for African heads of 
state to ensure active participation in the world trading system, and said multilateral trade 
negotiations must recognize and provide for Africa’s concerns, needs and interests in 
future WTO rules (NEPAD, 2001). In response, the G8’s Africa Action Plan committed 
to “applying our Doha commitment to comprehensive negotiations on agriculture aimed 
at substantial improvements in market access, reductions of all forms of export subsidies 
with a view to their being phased out, and substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support” (G8, 2002). 
The cause caught the imagination of a broad spectrum of parties, and has been 
pushed in numerous venues.  The next section examines the way in which the story was 
told. 
 
5.4 Influencing the influencers 
 
Both by design and because they have a compelling story, the West African states 
and cotton producers have garnered sympathetic media coverage of their plight. It is a 
story easily described as David vs. Goliath, painting the West Africans as the underdogs 
(good guys) and the Americans as the bully (bad guys). This interpretation can be framed 
to demonstrate the injustice of world trade, made all the more galling by the free-trade 
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rhetoric of the U.S. It plays well for those inclined toward dependency theory, who can 
point to the egregiousness of the U.S. subsidies, as well as those with an anti-American 
sentiment. 
The executive director of the IDEAS Centre said “It’s a sexy subject. It’s 
incongruous -- on the one hand, the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development] countries are helping the Africans and, on the other hand, they’re killing 
them. It’s very graphic. We knew we could get the journalists to write about it, and they 
did” (Imboden, 2004). The New York Times ran three editorials between August 2003 and 
April 2004 calling for the U.S. to remove farm subsidies. The paper’s language echoed 
material issued by Oxfam. One editorial quoted Burkina Faso President Compaoré as 
saying to the Americans, “We want you to equally concern yourself with the terror posed 
here by hunger and poverty, a form of terrorism your subsidies are aiding and abetting. If 
we cannot sell our cotton we will die,” and the president of Burkina Faso’s National 
Cotton Producers Union: “If the United States can go to the moon, which is rather 
complicated, one would think it could figure out a way, if it wanted, to help its cotton 
producers, without hurting us farmers in Africa” (New York Times, 2003a). 
The Times’ editorial board said no other crop is subsidised to such an outrageous 
degree (America’s cotton subsidies exceed the gross domestic product of Burkina Faso), 
and wrote “Americans would be horrified to learn that all the good accomplished by 
dedicated [Peace Corps] volunteers and millions of dollars in aid is overwhelmed by the 
havoc wreaked by Washington’s bloated cotton subsidies” (New York Times, 2003a). The 
Times’ 28 April 2004 editorial, following the WTO decision on Brazil, stated that “the 
glaring contradiction between American farm subsidies and the principles underlying the 
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global trade system has long posed a moral and political problem for Washington. Now it 
is also a legal problem” (New York Times, 2004). 
Other publications, such as the Economist, the Washington Post and the Wall 
Street Journal, reported regularly on the cotton issue, giving a venue for the West 
Africans to state their case. The Wall Street Journal in June 2002 ran an article titled 
“How a Cotton Glut Bred by U.S. Hurts Poor African Tillers” with the subtitle “Domestic 
Policy Trumps Foreign Policy” (Thurow and Kilman, 2002). An April 2004 editorial by 
the paper said the WTO ruling offers a “politically convenient excuse” for the U.S. 
president to scale back farm subsidies (Wall Street Journal, 2004). A Washington Post 
editorial said the abolition of U.S. cotton subsidies would do “both American taxpayers 
and poor foreign producers a favor” (Washington Post, 2004). In September 2003, an 
Economist article stated “America’s bold promises were belied by its actions.  Last year’s 
outrageous increase in American farming subsidies, and the cave-in at Cancun by 
American negotiators to their domestic cotton growers, made far more of an impression 
on poor countries than Washington’s high-minded words about freer farm trade – and 
rightly so” (Economist, 2003b). 
An Economist piece entitled “Free trade in chains” said removing subsidies in rich 
countries is “essential for poor farmers in poor countries whose lives are blighted by 
western protectionism” (Legrain, 2002). An Independent article concluded “The harsh 
truth is – as the failure of the World Trade Organization round in Cancun brutally showed 
– the industrialized world has abandoned any pretence that trade negotiations are 
anything to do with development” (Vallely, 2003). A Guardian headline said “Bush turns 
his back on the world’s poor” (Borger, 2002). An August 2004 Guardian piece following 
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the WTO agreement to scrap agricultural subsidies stated “abolishing these subsidies … 
is the best thing that can be done to help poor countries, and it would also be in the 
interests of rich countries as they would have $350-billion to spend elsewhere” (Mail & 
Guardian, 2004). One article said the “enormous increase” in subsidies for American 
farmers was “rightly regarded in Africa as a great blow to the continent’s economic 
aspirations” (Joseph, 2003).  
Nearly every major U.S. newspaper has covered the issue. An Illinois attorney 
created a web page (www.farmpolicy.com) to track news analysis of U.S. farm policy. 
He wrote in a letter to the Delta Farm Press, “I have not seen a single editorial 
supporting the farm bill or America’s case at the WTO in any of the major newspapers. 
… The political foundation for re-opening the current farm bill is clearly being set” 
(Good, 2004).  
The preceding sections have looked at the tactics by which the West African 
representatives have attempted to influence U.S. policy – in other words, how they have 
made their case. The following section explores the question of why: Why are they so 
motivated, why did this issue catch fire, and why now? 
 
5.5 Why cotton? 
 
In some respects, it is odd that U.S. cotton subsidies became the “poster child” for 
unfair trade practices. Cotton subsidies account for just 1 percent of agriculture subsidies 
paid to producers in OECD countries. Meat, milk and rice receive substantially more 
support (19, 17 and 11 percent of agriculture subsidies), and, to a lesser extent, so do 
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wheat and corn (7 and 5 percent) (Townsend, 2003). Producers of other crops in other 
countries probably have a stronger case. But West African cotton is the issue that caught 
fire. The emphasis on cotton in world trade talks has been described as “unprecedented” 
(Townsend, 2003). A www.google.com search on 8 June 2004 returned 10,900 sites that 
mentioned “cotton subsidies” compared to 3,610 sites on “sugar subsidies,” 2,040 sites 
on “corn subsidies,” 1,880 sites on “wheat subsidies” and 650 sites on “rice subsidies” 
(Baffes, 2004b, p. 16).  
This section aims to answer the question of why. There are at least four reasons: 
the cotton farmers, the producers’ unions, the states and the international financial 
institutions. These parties had a common interest and were supported by 
nongovernmental organizations, who helped them put together a strong campaign. 
 
(1) Cotton farmers have no alternative 
A trade policy analyst said Brazil’s case at the WTO was a sign of desperation 
(Seager, 2004). The same could be said of the efforts by the West African states. The 
three countries are among the poorest in the world. Benin, Mali and Burkina Faso ranked 
147th, 153rd and 159th, respectively, out of 162 countries on the 2001 United Nations’ 
Human Development Index. (The index is based on income, education and health 
indicators.) Life expectancy is 54 in Benin, 51 in Mali and 46 in Burkina Faso; GDP is 
$933, $753 and $965, respectively (UNDP, 2001). 
A 1997 analysis of Benin underscored the country’s lack of material resources. 
Little investment has flown into the country because Benin’s economy has few attractions 
for private entrepreneurs. “It has neither exploitable resources nor valuable agrarian 
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products; it possesses only a rudimentary infrastructure and a small population that 
cannot provide a market for much of a manufacturing sector. Industry is minimal” 
(Decalo, 1997, p. 50). Likewise, Burkina Faso’s situation is characterized as “quite bleak 
and its prospects limited” (Boudon, 1997, p. 128). “The particularly long dry season as 
well as the lack of good farming land and irrigation resulted in the underemployment of 
people in the countryside. Together, these economic realities implied limited 
opportunities for development” (Boudon, 1997, p. 128). Perhaps most important for a 
country as poor as Burkina Faso is for its economic situation to improve so that the 
“fragile fabric of civil society does not fray in the process of building this democracy” 
(Boudon, 1997, p. 141). 
These dire circumstances shed light on the motivation of the West Africans. They 
have almost nothing with which to compete in the global economy and nearly nonexistent 
opportunities for development. Cotton provides their best hope. They have invested 
heavily in this sector as the sole possibility for climbing out of poverty and keeping their 
countries stable. Therefore, it is inevitable they will fight bitterly to see it succeed. They 
have nothing to lose. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture did not prevent the U.S. from 
raising cotton subsidies to its farmers, so the West African producers concluded their 
“only chance” was to submit the cotton initiative (Goreux, 2004, p. 11). 
Being overly dependent on exports of agricultural commodities, whose prices are 
subject to large fluctuations, makes developing countries extremely vulnerable (Hart, 
1983, p. 6; Robinson, 1991, p. 381). It would be advisable for the West Africans to 
diversify their export base and reduce their dependency on cotton. However, the scope 
for substituting crops is extremely limited. Cotton cultivation expanded rapidly in West 
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Africa “because it was the crop providing the best return to the local population” 
(Goreux, 2004, p. 20). Conditions in the Sahel limit the kinds of crops that can be grown. 
During the 2001 Mali boycott, for example, most farmers were unable to replace cotton 
with other crops (Goreux, 2004, p. 21.)         
 
Photo 3: Cotton farmer near Bla, Mali, November 2004   Photo by E. Lynn Heinisch 
 
In the cotton initiative, the West Africans said their cotton producers have no 
development alternative because of their poverty and their land-locked position (WTO, 
2003a). Textile factories have been operating in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and several 
other West African countries for at least 30 years, but the results have been disappointing. 
While the Sahel has a comparative advantage in producing cotton because of low labour 
costs, it does not have an advantage in transforming fibre into textiles, due to expensive 
electrical costs and production costs that exceed domestic prices of ready-made clothes 
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(Goreux, 2004, p. 21). “Since the West African countries do not have the capacity to 
diversify into other trading sectors, the survival of their cotton production depends 
directly on a major rightening, if not the complete elimination, of domestic support and 
export subsidies on cotton” (ICTSD, Oxfam and IDEAS Centre, 2003, p. 1). 
A number of studies show that increasing the production of cash crop exports 
increases the income of rural households and helps reduce poverty (Gillson et al, 2004, p. 
62). Because cotton is cultivated by small family farms in areas where opportunities to 
grow other crops are limited and per capita income very low, cotton has a strong impact 
on reducing poverty (Goreux, 2004, p. 19). 
 In Benin, for example, the expansion of cotton production is credited with 
helping reduce rural poverty from 33 percent of households to 21 percent between 1995 
and 1998 (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 61). “There is a strong link between cotton prices and 
rural welfare in Benin … to the extent that fluctuations in world cotton prices are 
transmitted to farmers, they will have a significant effect on rural incomes and poverty” 
(Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 62). A WHO study in Burkina Faso concluded that the expansion 
of cotton cultivation was a major factor in improving health of households in the cotton 
belt. Poverty among cotton growers declined from 50 percent in 1992 to 42 percent in 
1998, while cotton production in the same period increased by 175 percent (Goreux and 
Macrae, 2003, p. 7). A WTO report said increased revenue from cotton has a direct 
impact on incomes in rural areas of the country where poverty is highest. 
Conversely, research in Benin indicated that a 40 percent drop in cotton prices, 
such as happened from December 2000 to May 2002, caused poverty among cotton 
growers to increase from 37 to 59 percent (Baffes, 2004a, p. viii).  “For many rural 
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households, [cotton] is the principal source of money that allows them to improve their 
living conditions, to have education and to ensure better health” (ROPPA, 2004, p. 4). In 
an oft-cited Oxfam publication, a Burkina Faso cotton farmer said “Cotton here is 
everything. It is used to build our schools and our health centers. We are all depending on 
cotton. But if cotton prices remain low, we have no hope for our future” (Watkins, 2002, 
Box 2).  
The depressed world price affects the financial ability of millions of poor rural 
families to send children to school and cover health expenses (Estur, 2003). As discussed 
earlier, farmers played a vital role in the restructuring of the cotton sectors in Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Mali. As the countries liberalise the sectors, they face world, not 
domestic, prices. With world prices declining, they get a higher share of a lower price 
(Gilbert and Varangis, 2003). Lacking an alternate source of income, they have no choice 
but to fight. 
 
(2) Strong producers’ unions 
The West African cotton producer unions have proven themselves to be 
politically effective. Bingen linked this ability to the skills needed to grow the difficult 
crop and meet grading standards. Their activism “suggests that the industrial-type 
discipline imposed on smallholder cotton producers has a catalytic mobilization effect … 
It fosters the development of consciousness among peasants roughly comparable to that 
more commonly found among factory workers. … Consequently, just as industrial 
workers historically have been drawn into the political arena in defence of their 
 97
recognized economic interests, cotton growers may be emerging as a new political force 
throughout West Africa” (Bingen, 1998, p. 276).  
Formed in July 2000, the Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA) represents rural farming families in 10 African 
countries. A March 2004 ROPPA document described four years of lobbying efforts to 
raise awareness about the negative impacts of American and European subsidies on rural 
farmers. It said cotton producers from Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali met in November 
2001 to “launch a loud, common call” to the U.S. and European Union to end their 
subsidies, whose influence on the fall of the world prices put many countries in an 
unsustainable situation. “The cotton producers and West African farming leaders came 
together with other actors in a united front to register the question of subsidies” at 
Cancun (ROPPA, 2004, p. 3). The lack of resulting measures to remedy the situation 
“demonstrates the necessity for producers to pursue their actions of speaking out and 
lobbying in order that they be compensated justly and equally for their work” (ROPPA, 
2004, p. 3).  
ROPPA described the cotton initiative at Cancun as a turning point in discussions 
on the future of cotton. Because it was not treated appropriately, it “rightly provoked the 
anger” of authorities and people in developing countries. Since then, “the mobilization of 
producers has not ceased” (ROPPA, 2004, p. 5). The ROPPA document cited the 
organization’s engagement with other partners, such as representatives from the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (EUMOA), and nongovernmental agencies. ROPPA is participating 
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in discussions about world trade with “diverse initiatives in favor of cotton” (ROPPA, 
2004, p. 5). 
Because of the low price of cotton, the document said, people in cotton-producing 
areas were getting poorer and the state was less able to invest in social sectors (health, 
water, education). “It is to denounce this state of affairs that there’s been a real united 
front of cotton producers with a diverse range of actors” (ROPPA, 2004, p. 6). ROPPA 
said it had formed an alliance with others to form a united defence of African cotton and 
family farming, which performs well and is competitive. “The West African cotton sector 
finds itself in a system of global exchanges with market rules over which it has 
practically no influence. In spite of the fact that its exports represent 13 percent of the 
world total, the region is not considered as a “price setter” (ROPPA, 2004, p. 4). 
Faced with this situation, the producers, “profiting from freedom of speech 
introduced by the democratization of African societies,” organized to defend their 
interests (ROPPA, 2004, p. 4). Because cotton is principally produced by farming 
families, the ROPPA document stated, the depressed world price not only cost the state 
foreign export earnings, but negatively impacted people’s quality of life (ROPPA, 2004, 
p. 5).  “Why are there producers in the same global market in which certain are more 
advantaged by the agricultural policies of their countries, in flagrant contradiction with 
the rules of world trade wanted by the WTO?” (ROPPA, 2004, p. 6). The ROPPA 
document discussed the changes implemented domestically in keeping with structural 
adjustment sought by the international financial institutions. “We will see if the partners 
in world trade really wish equity for all and a fight against poverty” (ROPPA, 2004, p. 6). 
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In the last decade, producers’ unions became increasingly politically active, which 
positioned them well to take on the U.S. subsidies. Not only did they have an incentive to 
campaign against the subsidies, but they had developed the skills and systems by which 
to be effective. 
 
(3) States losing money 
Under pressure from international financial institutions, Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Mali have withdrawn government intervention in their cotton sectors. Yet, they earn taxes 
from exports, and most of their export revenues come from cotton. They are overly 
dependent on cotton and have a vested interest in seeing the world cotton price rise. In 
their WTO “sectoral initiative” proposal, the countries focused on cotton’s “essential 
role” in the economic development of their countries. 
“It is clear that the price-reducing effects of subsidies has reduced the export 
earnings of African LDCs” (Goreux, 2004, p. 23). Goreux estimates the four countries 
that sponsored the cotton initiative lost 30 to 40 percent more from U.S. cotton subsidies 
than they received from American development assistance. U.S. cotton subsidies for 
2001-2002 cost Burkina Faso 12 percent of export earnings (1 percent of GDP), Mali 8 
percent of export earnings (1.7 percent of GDP) and Benin 9 percent of export earnings 
(1.4 percent of GDP) (Watkins, 2002). 
The ICAC estimated that the withdrawal of U.S. cotton subsidies would increase 
Malian cotton farmers’ income by more than 31 percent, from $500 to $659 a year, and 
would generate the country a gain of more than $55 million per year (U.S. House of 
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Representatives, 2003, p. 9). The countries have spent more than a decade restructuring 
their cotton sectors and want to see the pay-off. 
 
(4) International financial institutions want to see returns  
The West African cotton producers and governments have powerful and effective 
partners. “Cotton has captured the attention of a number of non-government 
organizations with a flair for dramatic public relations” (Townsend, 2003). These actors 
have been important in raising the media profile of the problem, but the most influential 
allies are undoubtedly the international financial institutions.  
The World Bank, the IMF and the WTO have spent more than 10 years working 
with the countries to liberalise their cotton sectors. They have invested human and 
financial resources in this effort. The success or failure of the West African cotton market 
will bear out whether their advice – indeed, their premise -- was sound. More 
importantly, the financial institutions have loaned money to the countries. The health of 
the cotton sector is vital to the countries’ ability to repay those loans and reduce 
dependency on the international financial institutions.  
 
Each of these players (farmers, producers’ unions, states, international financial 
institutions) has an incentive to see the West African cotton sector succeed. They were 
aided in developing their strategy by effective campaigners. “The Africans knew they had 
a legitimate issue with cotton. They knew they had a fight. But a small country doesn’t 
know how to put it so that the big countries don’t push it under the table. They didn’t 
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know how to make a mess. It was clearly the Africans [leading the effort]. We just helped 
them do it” (Imboden, 2004). 
The IDEAS Centre, which teamed up with the West African governments and 
Oxfam in April 2003, framed the story of cotton as a development issue. “We wanted to 
show clearly the nexus between poverty and development” (Imboden, 2004). The cotton 
initiative was unique, he said, in that it spoke specifically about poverty reduction. It did 
not seek preferential treatment, but showed the inequality of the system. “The Africans 
said ‘We did what is required and you didn’t, so we can’t get the fruits of the policies.’” 
Their strategy included three components: 1) Mobilizing nongovernmental 
organizations, 2) Taking a president to the WTO and 3) Using highest-level politicians to 
score clout and credibility. 
Oxfam was the first NGO to push the subject, issuing a study in 2002 that 
demonstrated the impact of U.S. cotton subsidies on Africa. While Oxfam had the 
research and advocacy capability, it did not have the expertise of using the WTO system. 
ROPPA, the association of West African cotton producers, had first-hand information 
and an engaged constituency, but did not know how to intervene in the world trade talks. 
By pulling together, the parties drew on their complementary strengths. 
Compaoré’s June 2003 presentation of the cotton initiative to the WTO Trade 
Negotiations Committee was “the first time in the history of the WTO that a president 
came to make his case” (Imboden, 2004). There was extensive media coverage. “Up until 
then, the Africans didn’t fully believe it, they didn’t believe they could stand up [to the 
OECD countries]. Once they saw the reaction to the president’s statement and how the 
other countries reacted, they saw that no one could be against it.” 
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The group intentionally used presidents to “put it on a political level.” In addition 
to Touré’s visit to the U.S., President Kerekou of Benin went to Brussels and Paris to 
speak with representatives of the European Commission. Using presidents to carry the 
message gave the issue weight, and forced the OECD countries to respond accordingly, 
Imboden said. The July 2004 WTO agreement to prioritize cotton was the resulting 
“major victory.” “What the Americans gave [with that agreement] is that cotton has to 
have a solution that goes faster and further. They never gave that before” (Imboden, 
2004). 
The protagonists were helped, he said, by the fact that the WTO Doha round is a 
development round. Because of this, the Cancun meeting was attended by development 
ministers from several OECD countries for the first time. “And they spoke up and forced 
their delegations to take the issue seriously” (Imboden, 2004). 
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Chapter 6. Likelihood of Success  
 
Momentum is one thing, but results are another. Media coverage and support of 
high-profile allies does not guarantee that the West African governments and cotton 
producers will get what they want: removal of the U.S. cotton subsidies. The U.S. Farm 
Bill, with its support for cotton farmers, sets policy through 2008. If the U.S. accepts that 
it must reduce cotton subsidies, the bill will have to be amended. This chapter looks at 
factors determining the likelihood of that happening. 
A 2003 study found that the Farm Bill violates the spirit of U.S. trade 
liberalization rhetoric, but probably not the letter of U.S. WTO commitments (Orden, 
2003, p. 1). Orden said this divergence does not preclude progress on agriculture during 
the WTO Doha negotiations. However, “there has never been a strong connection 
between previously negotiated international agreements and changes to U.S. farm policy” 
(Orden, 2003, p. 18). He states WTO constraints had little effect in “disciplining” 
American subsidy levels when the Farm Bill was passed. 
The ICAC executive director believes that distortions in agricultural markets will 
eventually be eliminated.  Though farmers enjoy cultural and political support, “subsidies 
have reached international visibility and pressures are increasing. Therefore, it is likely 
that a reduction and eventual elimination of agricultural subsidies, including subsidies to 
cotton production, will be negotiated with the WTO” (Townsend, 2003). Drawing a 
comparison with earlier efforts to end trade-distorting measures, he estimated it would 
take another 20 years before subsidies to cotton production were eliminated. 
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Pressure to reform farm support policies has increased in recent years, due to the 
rising costs of such support and the requirements of global agreements (Effland, 2000, p. 
21), as well as the substantial increase of the US cotton subsidies and the 30-year record 
low prices (Baffes, 2004a, p. 20). These challenges “may test the strength of public 
support for the direct income support programs typical of the last 70 years” (Effland, 
2000, p. 25).  Perhaps the time is right for a policy shift. 
A tremendous amount of debate preceded passage of the 2002 Farm Bill. The 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture heard testimony from 
agricultural economists, commodity groups and farm organizations (Effland, 2001, p. 3). 
The U. S. Department of Agriculture stated “Farm policy … must promote more 
sustainable prosperity for farmers through market orientation without engendering long-
term dependence on government support” (USDA, 2001). It also noted that U.S. domestic 
policy must meet the country’s international obligations. 
In June 2003, the Houser of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa held a 
hearing on “Boosting Africa’s Agricultural Trade.” Chairman Edward Royce (R-CA) 
spoke about the damaging effect of U.S. subsidies on African exporters, singling out 
cotton. Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ) said “I think it is high time we assess the 
impact of our government’s agricultural policies, particularly on farm subsidies and the 
impact on the developing world, especially Africa” (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2003, p. 2). Payne said the U.S. should make better use of its developmental assistance to 
Africa. “We must end the inequities and agricultural policies” (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2003, p. 5). 
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Yet, just as domestic politics were the main influence in formulating U.S. farm 
policy, they – not international trade obligations or pressures -- will be the main driver of 
any changes to that policy. The cost to taxpayers could be the linchpin. The European 
Union, for example, made concessions on its agricultural subsidies during the Uruguay 
Round of the WTO because it was “looking for a way out” of its far too expensive 
subsidy program (Pant, 2002, p. 218). The cost of U.S. cotton subsidies exceeds the value 
of the country’s cotton exports. From 1999 to 2003, subsidies cost an average of 16 
percent more than earnings from cotton exports (Goreux, 2004, p. 6).   
Goreux suggested it would be possible to amend the U.S. Farm Bill if solid 
research work was combined with well-focused public relations campaigns. “The 
American public needs to be better informed of the cotton issue” (Goreux, 2004, p. 9). 
His claims were bolstered by a January 2004 poll, reportedly the first significant survey 
of how Americans feel about farm subsidies. The poll, by the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes (PIPA), determined that “public attitudes on agricultural subsidies are 
very much at odds with the U.S. policies” (PIPA, 2004, p. 3). A majority (77 percent) 
favoured subsidies for small farmers but opposed them (65 percent) for large farming 
businesses, who are the primary recipients. Most Americans do not support a policy of 
providing subsidies on a regular annual basis. Thirty-four percent favoured regular annual 
payments to small farmers, with 44 percent in favour of assistance only in bad years. The 
numbers were much smaller if the recipient was a large farming business. 
“The scope of subsidies the public supports is so much narrower than is currently 
provided that, if the public’s preferences were followed, this would largely remove the 
current obstacle in trade negotiations” (PIPA, 2004, p. 23). The survey revealed that a 
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large number of Americans have incorrect assumptions related to farm subsidies. The 
better-informed respondents were less supportive of subsidies. The survey also found that 
a majority of respondents supported U.S. compliance with WTO decisions. While there is 
public support for some kind of assistance to farmers, it is rooted in the mistaken 
assumption that American agriculture is made up of small farming families, not the 
consolidated and industrialised big business that food production has become (Effland, 
2000, p. 25). Goreux argued that well-pointed messages, countering those from the cotton 
lobby and directed at Congress and the American public, could have an effect. Just as 
NGOs helped bring the cotton issue to the forefront of discussions at Cancun, he said, 
they could help with such a campaign (Goreux, 2004, p. 9). 
If U.S. policymakers wanted to reduce or eliminate subsidies, they could use the 
excuse that their hands are tied by international commitments. In a report for Congress as 
it considered the 2002 Farm Bill, the Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture 
said the country’s ability to provide support for agriculture may be constrained by 
international WTO obligations. (The Commission was established by the 1996 Farm Bill 
to review changes in the condition of “production agriculture”.) The minority view of the 
Commission noted that U.S. trading partners would either object to flouting of WTO 
commitments or would “respond in kind.” “While the U.S. argues vigorously for the 
benefits of freer trade and lower subsidies abroad, we appear to do everything we can to 
pump up and hide our own domestic programs. We can’t expect to have it both ways” 
(Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture, 2001, p. 17). 
Policymakers can use international obligations as an out when they are 
confronting domestic political pressure. Leaders let themselves “be pushed” into policies 
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they may privately favour but could not sell to their electorate (Putnam, 1988, p. 428). 
“Policymakers find it easier to say no to farm groups if there is some external constraint 
that they can point to. Congress and farm groups are finding that the WTO agreement is 
one such constraint” (Hart and Babcock, 2001). The Commission suggested that the U.S. 
should provide a unified front in the next round of international agricultural trade talks by 
showing a “strong resolve to move toward programs and policies that are less trade 
distorting” (Commission on 21st Century Production Agriculture, 2001, p. 36). 
By agreeing to limits on farm subsidies, countries win concessions from others to do the 
same and generate increased agricultural trade (Hart and Babcock, June 2001).  Hence, 
the August 2004 WTO announcement that members agreed to reduce subsidies by 20 
percent (albeit without a timetable or plan for implementation). 
In fact, the real struggle is not between developing and developed countries, but 
between the United States and the European Union. Both have put forth proposals for 
reducing subsidies, but have not been obliged to take action, because each claims the 
other is not offering enough. Delcros analyzed the tensions between the U.S. and the 
Europeans that led to a stalemate, with neither side willing to concede on farm subsidies. 
He concluded that any change in policies would have to happen simultaneously, as in 
mutual disarmament negotiations during the Cold War (Delcros, 2002, p. 227). Yet, 
agricultural trade “is not currently, and is unlikely to become, a model of free-trade 
principles regardless of the outcome of trade negotiations” because most nations hold 
food self-sufficiency as a critically important goal (Commission on 21st Century 
Production Agriculture, 2001, p. 19). 
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Even if the West African governments succeed in having U.S. subsidies removed, 
there is no guarantee the results will be the ones sought. The Cato Institute said prices of 
major farm commodities have been falling for the past 50 years and will continue to do so 
because of advances in technology and economies of scale (Edwards and DeHaven, 
2002).  The ICAC said removal of subsidies would result in lower production and higher 
prices in the short term, but that impact would be offset over the long term as world 
production shifted to non-subsidising countries. Additionally, the ICAC said, higher 
prices would reduce the growth of cotton consumption (ICAC, 2002, p. 7). A study 
simulating the impact of removal of U.S. cotton subsidies determined that the world 
cotton price would increase by about 2 percent in 2005-2006 due to reduced exports from 
the U.S. Then other producers would expand their production to take advantage of higher 
prices, and this adjustment would cancel out most of the price increase by 2013-2014 
(Pan, et al, 2004, pp. 2-3). A senior fellow at the New America Foundation, a public 
policy institute, envisioned an outcome even more destructive for the farmers. He said if 
their region became attractive to agribusiness interests, machines would ultimately 
replace family farmers. “The anti-subsidy movement, if it succeeds, is more likely to 
eliminate developing world farmers than to enrich them” (Lind, 2003). 
The likelihood of West African cotton-producing states being compensated, as 
requested in the WTO initiative on cotton, is remote. An ILEAP analysis determined that, 
while the claim had “an extremely strong moral and political basis,” it went far beyond 
the current commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture (ILEAP, 2004, p. 3-4). The 
policy brief concluded “retroactive compensation has no valid legal basis, however could 
still be pursued from a moral and political standpoint in compensation negotiations” 
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(ILEAP, 2004, p. 26). One analyst proposed instead that the U.S. and E.U. could make 
contributions aimed to improve productivity and reduce poverty in the African cotton 
belt. “The scheme could be justified on several grounds. First, in that area, populations 
have shown that they are willing to work hard to get out of the poverty trap. Second, the 
scheme could be implemented with low overhead costs (and) … would lead to tangible 
results. Third, it would bring some coherence between trade and aid policies” (Goreux, 
2004, p. 7). 
It is impossible to know which, if any, of the predictions is likely to come true. 
But the timing of the West African campaign against the U.S. subsidies coincides with 
international and U.S. domestic debates on appropriate levels of support for farmers. 
Their lobbying efforts have found an audience already engaged in discussion and familiar 
with the issue, which has removed an important hurdle. What is less clear is how long the 
course may be. 
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Chapter 7. Implications and conclusion 
 
The outcome of the cotton dispute could have far-reaching implications. The 
actions by Brazil and the West African states have been described as seminal events in 
the WTO, which could pave the way for other countries hurt by rich country subsidies to 
take legal recourse (WTO, 2003b). Some claim that a win by Brazil could open the door 
for additional WTO challenges of U.S. farm programs (IATP, 2004, p.4) and “start a 
domino effect” (Gillson, et al, 2004, p. 21). 
During the '90s, developing countries made great progress in liberalising their 
trade regimes (Michalopoulos, 1999, p. 4) and adopting principles of free trade. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Farm Bills in 2002 and 1996 practically tripled farm subsidies over 
what they were in the mid-'90s (Edwards and DeHaven, 2002). That U.S. support 
programs have increased so dramatically since the inception of the WTO has been 
viewed as hypocrisy and has “enraged countries around the world” (IATP, 2004, p. 4). 
The West African challenge to the U.S. cotton subsidies parallels growing discontent and 
vocal opposition from the developing world. As the ROPPA network of West African 
cotton producers said, they see themselves as a case study representing problems facing 
other agricultural sectors due to distortions of international trade. 
Diplomats, presidents and farmers from many African countries have criticised 
subsidies in the developed world.  “It’s ridiculous that rich farmers are getting richer and 
poor farmers are getting poorer. We are kept out of the world market. When countries 
like America, Britain and France subsidize their farmers, we get hurt,” said a Ugandan 
farmer (Becker, 2003a). The South African agriculture attaché said “We would give up 
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foreign aid if the farm subsidies were eliminated. The subsidies give the rich-nation 
farmers the upper hand in all markets, and we can’t even compete in our own markets, 
much less theirs” (Becker, 8 Sept. 2003). Ugandan President Museveni spoke in the U.S. 
of ending “rich country tariffs and subsidies that are keeping African agriculture in a state 
of pre-industrial wretchedness, complete with cycles of famine” (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2003, p. 2). 
Given the WTO ruling against U.S. subsidies, as well as the momentum this issue 
has acquired and the findings that Americans do not favour the kind of subsidies their 
government pays farmers, the stage could be set for a shift in U.S. policy. That depends 
on whether the U.S. Congress and Administration are willing and able to overcome the 
political incentives motivating subsidies to their cotton farmers.  
This paper has considered the factors that led to the confrontation between the 
West African states and the U.S., with an eye toward understanding how and why it 
happened, and why the cause gained momentum. It examined the domestic influences 
affecting the cotton industries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and the U.S., and the 
international context that shaped these influences. The paper studied the West Africans’ 
campaign, their use of the WTO, the media and other public forums, and their strategy of 
speaking in concert, with the support of influential allies. Behind these effective tactics, 
there appear to be four key actors spurring the momentum against U.S. cotton subsidies. 
These are the West African cotton farmers, the producers’ unions, the states and the 
international financial institutions. 
The subject lends itself to areas for further research. It would be helpful to analyse 
specifically how the farmers in Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have been affected by 
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efforts to liberalise their cotton industries and how those efforts have increased their 
share of the world price. And to measure such growth against the negative impact of the 
U.S. subsidies, i.e. what is the net outcome of the gains from liberalisation versus the 
losses from the depressed world price? It would be useful to explore the factors delaying 
complete liberalisation in those countries, in order to better understand the roadblocks. 
One could also take a closer look at lobbying efforts targeting the Americans, speaking 
with U.S. policymakers and the National Cotton Council to learn how, if and by whom 
they are being pushed to reduce subsidies, and their responses. Such research would give 
an indication of the likelihood and timing of reduction or removal of the U.S. subsidies. 
The campaign implies repercussions beyond Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and the 
U.S. It holds significance for farmers all over the world and, as such, is being closely 
watched. Whether or not the West African governments and cotton farmers will be 
successful with their campaign remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome, it is likely to 
be regarded as a watershed incident in international trade negotiations, and an example 
from which others will learn. 
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